Whitehead's philosophy of education by Donelson, Edith M.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1961
Whitehead's philosophy of
education
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/24385
Boston University
BOSTON UNI1SRSITY 
GR.~U\.Tu 3CFOOL 
Thesis 
wHIT~HEAD ' S PHILOSO. • .'HY 
OF 
SDUCATION 
by 
Edith M. Donelson 
(A. B. , Pembroke College , 1948) 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Haster of Arts 
1961 
APPROVED 
by 
First Reader 
Professor of Philosophy 
.Second Reader • J . . . . ~ . . . . . . 
essor of Philosophy 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I . INTRODUCTION 
l . The Prob lem of the Thesis • • • • • • • • 
2 . Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 . Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4 . Hethodology of the Thesis 
II . THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION 
. . . . . . . . 
l. Problems of Traditional Education . . . . 
i. Inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 
3 
3 
4 
6 
7 
ii. Dogmatism • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 
2. 
3 . 
The Process of Learning • • . . . . . 
i . Self- education . . • • • . . . . . 
ii. Motivation • . . . . . . . . . . . 
iii. 
iv . 
The 
i. 
Rhythm •• • • • • 
( 1) ~omance • . . 
(2) Precision •• 
(3) Generalization 
. . . . . . . . • • 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
Freedom and Discipline . . . . • . . • 
Aims of Teaching • • • • . • • . . • • 
Subject hatter • • • • • . • • . • • . 
( l) Limitations • • . • . • • • . . • 
(2) Applications • • . • . . • • . • 
iii 
17 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
26 
28 
32 
32 
34 
37 
Chapter 
ii. Style • • • • • . . 
iii . ~v isdom . . . . . . 
. . . . . . • • • • 
. . . . . . . . 
iv 
39 
40 
4. Summary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 44 
III . THE COS110LCX;ICAL FRAMEL ORK OF THE PRO:ESS 
l. The Ontological .:. rinciple • • • • • • • • 46 
2. 
3 . 
i . 
ii. 
iii. 
Category of the Ultimate . . . . . . . 
Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(l) Actual occasions . . . . . . . . 
(2) Prehensions • • . . . . . . . . . 
(3) Concrescence . . . . . . . . . . 
Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
( l) 
( 2) 
(3) 
Objectificat i on . .. . . . . • • • 
Inheri tance • • . ... . • • • • • • 
Eternal objects • • . . . • • • • 
Perception •••••• • • • • • • . . . . 
i . Reception . . . . . . . . . . 
Causal efficacy • • . . . . • • • ( l ) 
( 2) Presentational immediacy • • • • 
ii. Symbolism . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Human Think ing • . . • . • • . • . . • 
i. Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ii. Consciousness • . . . . . • • • . • • 
48 
50 
50 
52 
55 
58 
59 
60 
63 
65 
65 
65 
67 
68 
70 
70 
74 
Chapter 
iii. knowledge • 
( 1) 
(2) 
Hemory • 
Anticipation • 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . • • 
. . . 
. . . . . • • 
v 
75 
76 
78 
( 3) Judgment • • • • • • • • • • • • • 79 
IV . 
4 . Summary • . • • • . . • • • . • • • • . • 
VALUES IN THE PRJCESS 
l. 
2 . 
The Sources of Value . • . • . . • • . • • 
i . Evaluation • • . • . • • . . • • . • • 
( 1) Potentiality • . • • . . • • • • 
( 2) Actuality . • . . . • • • • . • • 
(3) Reason • • • . • • . • . • . • • 
ii. Morality • . . • . . • . . • • . . • • 
( 1) Importance . . • . • • • • • . 
( 2) Ideal aims • . . • • . • • • • • 
iii . God . . . . . . . . . • . • • • . . • 
( 1) Primor dial nature • . . . . . . • 
(2) Consequent nature . . . . . • • • 
(3) Superjective nature • • . . • • • 
The Values of Civilization • . • . . . . • 
i. Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . ii. Beauty • 
iii. Adventure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv . Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
81 
84 
85 
86 
88 
91 
93 
93 
95 
96 
99 
100 
102 
103 
105 
107 
109 
111 
vi 
Chapter 
v . Goodness • . . • • . • • • • • . . . • 112 
3 . The Hierarchy of Values . . . • . • . . • 114 
4 . Summary • • . • • • . • . . . • • • • . • 117 
v. ~PLI8&.TIONS OF THE I'RVCESS 
1. Secondary School Curriculum • . . . • . • 122 
i . Literary Education . • . • . • . • . • 126 
( 1) Language • . . . • • . . . • 127 
(2) Classics . • • • . . • . • . • • 131 
(3) Art • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • 133 
ii. Scientific Education • • • • . • • . • 134 
( 1) Natural science . . • • • • • 135 
(2) Mathematics • • • . • • • • • 137 
iii. Technical Education • . • • . • • 138 
2 . Universities • . . • • . . . • . • • • • • 140 
i . Imaginative Insight • . • • . • • 142 
ii. Staff • • . • • • . • . . • • • • . • 143 
iii. Administration • • • . • . • . • . 145 
iv. Business School • . . . • . • . . . • 145 
3. Contemporary Application • • . • • . • 146 
VI. CONCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 152 
BIBLIOGR\?HY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 159 
AB STR...c\CT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 167 
CHAPrER I 
INTRODUCTION 
l. The Problem of the Thesis 
The problem of this thesis is to collect and coordinate 
Alfred North vlhitehead's theories of education, to demon-
strate their foundation in his metaphysical position, to 
relate them specifically to his theories of value, and to 
show their practical application. 
According to \.J'hitehead: "Speculative Philosophy is 
the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system 
of general ideas in terms of which every element of our 
experience can be interpreted."1 The major portion of 
Process and Reality is devoted to the interpretation of 
experience in terms of the Categories, Whitehead does not, 
however, subject his philosophy of education per se to such 
a scrutiny. In fact, there is no systematic development 
of a philosophy of education. 
H. W. Holmes objects that Whitehead has made relatively 
1. Whitehead, Process and Reality ( New York: The Hacmillan 
Company, 1929), p.~ 
1 
f ew of his views on education explicit. 1 The collected 
lectures entitled Aims of Education and seven of the essays 
in Science and Philosophy are devoted directly to dis-
cussions of education. Elsewhere, throughout his works, 
s pecific references are made to the field. Much of the 
material in Modes of Thought, Adventures of Ideas, and 
Science and the Modern World is applicable to one or 
another phase of learning or education. Compared to the 
prodigious output of John Dewey this may seem meagre but 
there is never any doubt of Whitehead's interest in or his 
devotion to the cause of education. He says: 
~hen one considers in its length and in its 
breadth the importance of this question of 
the education of the nation's young , the 
broken lives, the defeated hopes, the national 
failures, which result from the frivolous in-
ertia with which it is treated , it is diffi-
cult to restrain within oneself a savage rage.2 
As t h is study progresses it will be seen tha t there is, 
indeed , sufficient material both explicit and imp licit to 
2 
form a clear picture of Whitehead's philosophy of education. 
1. "Whitehead's Views on Educa tion, " The Philosophy of 
Alfred North Whitehead, ed. P. A. Schilpp (New YorK: 
Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 622 . 
2 . Whitehead, Aims of Education ( New York : The New American 
Library, [T9Z9~1955), p . 26. 
2. Definitions 
Throughout the thesis references are made to the 
philosophy of organism and the organic philosophy. Both 
terms re f er to Whitehead's metaphysical system as a whole 
attlare used, as he uses them, without capitalization. 
Whitehead finds it necessary to introduce many terms 
not usually found in philosophic literature . The organic 
philosophy calls for a vocabulary in which concepts of 
inert matter, an underlying substratum of substanee, a 
static universe , bi- furcated nature are not imbedded. The 
words we use affect our thoughts . Whitehead's novel 
vocabulary is introduced in this thesis as need to explain 
the concepts it refers to arises . Definitions of the 
terminology grow out of a disclosure of the doctri nes. 
3 . Limitations 
Most of the doctrines contained in the organic phi-
losophy serve to deepen the understanding of Whitehead ' s 
main educational tenet: "The students are alive, and the 
purpose of education is to stimulate and guide their self-
development . "l The scope of this thesis does not permit 
inclusion of more than a ske letal outline of Whitehead's 
1 . ~. , preface . 
3 
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cosmology. In Process and Reality Whitehead insists at the 
beginning that his Categories will not be understandable 
until one has read their elucidation in the rest of the 
book. It is, therefore, necessary to digest the elucidation 
and attempt to include in the explanations of the main points 
sufficient definitions of terms to relate the cosmology to 
proposed educational practices. 
4. Methodology of the Thesis 
Most of the criticisms of Whitehead by competent scholars 
involve a misunderstanding of his metaphysical position. 
Hutchins, for examp le, has taken exception to Whitehead 's 
educational policy as expressed in "Harvard : The Future . 111 
Later, A. W. Levi analyzed the difficulty: nProfessor White-
head and President Hutchins differ on matters of educational 
policy primarily because they have committed themselves to 
different systems of metaphysics."2 It is, therefore, 
important that the relation between Whitehead 's metaphysical 
system and his philosophy of education be made explicit. 
1. Cf. R. 1'1. Hut~hins, "A Reply to Professor Whitehead," 
The Atlantic Monthly, 158(1936), 582-88. 
2. "The Problem of Higher Education: Whitehead and Hutchins," 
Harvard Educational Review, 7(1937), 453 . 
Chapter two will set forth Whitehead's conception of 
education as a process . The groundwork will be laid for 
relating the doctrines of his metaphysical system to his 
general theories of education. An outline of the organic 
philosophy in chapter three gives the framework for the 
proposed educational practices as well as delineating White-
head's epistemology. 
The normative elements of Whitehead 's philosophy of 
education are shown in chapter four to be an integral part 
of the metaphysical system. The organic philosophy, a 
"value SJmthesis"1in itself, locates the source of value 
in an anlysis of reality. 
General aims , the epistemology and the axiology are 
brought together in chapter five in outlining Whitehead's 
specific applications of the process. Further applications 
of his position not covered in his works are suggested. 
1. See Richard M. Millard, "The Place of Value in Hhite-
head's Philosophy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Boston University), 1950. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION 
1. Problems of Traditional Education 
Whitehead, noted primarily as a mathematician and 
philosopher, was at the same time an educator. Lectures 
prepared for his students comprise much of his published 
works. At one time he held an administrative post in the 
field of education. His interest in schools was aroused 
early, when as a pre-school child he accompanied his father 
on visits to his three parochial schools; for infants, for 
girls, and for boys. Although his father had given up 
teaching for the ministry, he had never lost his interest in 
education. The young Alfred, having focused his attenti on 
upon the problems of education maintained a lifelong interest 
in it. There are fifteen essays among h i s published works, 
coveri ng the years from 1912 to 1936, s pecifically devoted 
to the topic. 
Toward the end of his life Whitehead confessed that 
"the education of a human being is a most comp lex topic, 
which we have hardly begun to understand. The only point on 
which I feel certain is that there is no widespread, simple 
6 
solution. "l At no time , in the early years as a mathe-
matics teacher in England nor later as a professor of 
philosophy at Harvard , did Whitehead discover or propose 
a system that would be a cure-all for the problems of 
education. Instead, he published essays dealing with 
various problems of education. In other works theories 
applicable to educative problems are to be found either 
explicitly or implicitly related to the topic. His major 
work, Process and Reality, for example , makes few direct 
references to education yet in it is found a description 
of experience explicative of his theories of learning out-
lined in Aims of Education. His works , as a who~, hold 
the key to the understanding of \fhitehead ' s philosophy of 
education. 
i . Inertia 
Eng land , in the first quarter of this century when 
Whitehead was starting on his career, was shocked by a 
war it didn ' t understand , a war that changed the complexion 
of its society. \fuitehead , recognizing the dawn of a new 
era, knew a reappraisal was needed in curriculum planning, 
in teacher training, in determining the role education 
1. Ibid., p. 26 . 
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should play in shaping a new society. For him philosophy 
of education is a part of philosophy of civilization. His 
melioristic view of social progress casts education in an 
important role. Man can improve his own social environ-
ment if he will. H~v he trains and guides his children 
determines to a large extent the path civilization will 
follow. 
Traditional education was then, as it still is, too 
often a funnel through which inert ideas are poured into 
the minds of pupils. Whitehead protests that 
the students are alive, and the purpose of 
education is to stimulate and guide their 
self-development. It follows as a corollary 
from this premise, that the teacher also 
should be alive with living thoughts.! 
This protest against dead knowledge, against inert ideas, 
is but a small part of the larger protest Whitehead makes 
throughout his life against the conception of reality as 
inert. 
Without knov;ing Whitehead 's cosmological reasons for 
rejecting dead knowledge his fears of the effect of inertia 
in the education of children can be understood. He points 
out that "education with inert ideas is not only useless; 
1. Whitehead, Aims of Education (New York: The New 
American LibraiY:[ 1929] 1955), p. 26. 
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it is, above all things, harmful. 111 The traditional con-
ception of knowledge reflects Platonic thought; the object 
of knowledge is a changeless world of ultimate reality. 
Opinion or belief is the most one can entertain concerning 
the world of material, changing things. Whitehead comments: 
The final wisdom has been pictured as the 
changeless contemplation of changeless reality. 
Knowledge in abstraction from action has been 
exalted. Action is thereby conceived as being 
concerned with a world of shadows.2 
Whitehead's world of activity, far from being a shadowy 
realm, is the world of reality. 
Knowledge acquired as an outcome of activity is not 
dead. I<nowledge drawn from living experience is no burden 
for it may apply to future experience. If the world of 
activity is the real world then ideas of changeless 
absolutes are inert. They are useless for the world of 
activity. If we wish our children to be healthy growing 
creatures we cannot afford to bind their minds with inert 
ideas. In Whitehead's words, "As we think, we live. 113 
1. Ibid., p. 13. 
2. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1957), ~ 112. 
3. Whitehead, Modes . . . , P• 87. 
Growth is change, activity. Inert thoughts inhibit a 
mind shrinking its horizons, cramping growth, preparing a 
child for nothi ng in a changing world. The school of 
thought that conceives of education as a training of 
faculties would have us believe that the ideas thought 
are not significant. It is the mental gymnastic re-
quired to learn anything whatsoever which is significant. 
Stringent practice develops mental tools preparing the 
child to cope with adult problems when that time comes. 
Whitehead protests that at every stage of growth the 
human organism must cope with its environment, must solve 
its own problems. Even if the child could be kept in a 
state of suspended responsibility for his reactions the 
world he would meet as an adult cannot be the same world 
the tool theorists were preparing him for. Subject-
centered curriculla often over-emphasize memorization of 
inert ideas neither gleaned from the life of the child 
nor applicable to his life finding their justification in 
the tool theory of learning. 
Present day advocates of an activity curriculum 
might at this point hope they have found another champion. 
Whitehead does have many points of agreement with 
John Dewey, particularly in their common emphasis upon 
10 
1 1 
first-hand experiences in the learning process. White-
head's criticism of traditional practices is not as 
extreme as Dewey's. He is not as wholly rejective of 
traditional educational forms. There is more of the 
cautionary note than the revolutionary sound. Education-
al institutions must function in a systematic fashion , 
therefore it often happens that certain types of experiences 
are dismissed in the interest of system. There is a hairline 
balance between order and freedom. Whitehead says that 
educational theory must consider "the contrast between 
order as the condition for excellence, and order as 
stifling the freshness of living."1 
Relevant experience of the world around us presents 
the mind with information that is important. Whitehead 
attributes the fact that John Stuart Mill exhibited a 
limited mentality to "his peculiar education which gave 
him system before any enjoyment of the relevant experience."2 
We are assured that Adam saw the beasts of creation before 
he named them. Yet it is still a valid criticism that 
cows and horses are known by name in the nursery long 
before most urban children know them by acquaintance. 
1. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1929), p.~4. 
2. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1957), p-.-8. 
Whitehead does not wholly condemn vicarious experience. 
Knowledge of the past can only be acquired through 
vicarious experience. It is inert knowledge, however, 
if it fails to further the understanding of the present. 
Whitehead calls the present "holy ground" for it con-
tains all that there is. 1 Education should present ideas 
to the child that are important to his daily existence. 
These main ideas must be few in number and be shown in 
every possible interrelationship with one another. White-
head states this point as the two educational commandments 
that can guard against the mental stagnation of inert 
ideas: "'Do not teach too many subjects,' and again, 
2 
' What you teach, teach thoroughly.'" Whitehead here 
pleads for revision of the tradit i onal subject curriculum 
rather than, as in the case of Dewey, a rep lacement of it 
by another kind of curriculum. 
1. ~Jhitehead, Aims ••• , p . 14. 
2. Ibid, p. 14. Lothar Kahn in a discussion of American 
-vs:- Continental Education ("American Education Has 
its Points," Foreign Service Journal as reprinted 
in Best Articles & Stor1es, III, No. 5, 15-18, 
May~9) concludes that the European critics are 
right who object to the mad rushing from topic to 
topic in our system that discourages "retention of 
facts, but, more important, it obvi ates learning in 
de pth." 
12 
Traditional education fails to solve the problem of 
perspective when it deemphasizes the present, or the 
future, to concentrate upon the past. Not the form of a 
traditional curriculum but the content is here called to 
task. Whitehead insists that "in eithe r alternative, 
whether the past be lost or be dominant, the present is 
enfeebled."! He generalizes his concrete solution of 
the problem in his statement of the dynamic aim that 
"education is the acquisition of the art of the utilization 
of knowledge. 112 Flexibility and adaptability developed 
during the school years are proof against the stagnation 
of inert ideas in later life. A sense of the novelty of 
life, once awakened, seldom slumbers. 
ii. Dogmatism 
Close to the problem of inertia is that of dogmatism. 
The positivists who have claimed Whitehead at one time or 
another are not aware of his criticism of them. They 
1. Whitehead, Aims •.• , p. 16. Contemporary existent-
ialist psycn!atry, keyed to analyzing the patient's 
world-design in ~erms of his relationship to the past 
and the future, adds a footnote to Whitehead's views 
on the dangers of dead knowledge. Cf. May, Rollo, 
Ernst Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger (ed.) Existence, 
A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: 
BaSIC Books, Inc:7 1958). 
2 . Whitehead, Modes •.. , p. 203. 
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have worked themselves "into a state of complete con-
tentment with an ultimate irrationality, ,.l Whitehead comments . 
He has great respect for the formal disciplines, especially 
mathematical logic , but he finds that philosophy must seek 
the reasons for facts as well as the connections between 
facts . There is "reference to form beyond the direct 
meanings of words . "2 An incurable vagueness characterizes 
the most general and inclusive ideas. He maintains in 
considering the history of ideas that 
the notion of ' mere knowledge' is a high 
abstraction which we should dismiss from 
our minds • • • The higher generalities 
rarely receive any accurate verbal ex-
pression. They are hinted at through 
their special forms appropriate to the age 
in question. 3 
Here again \Vhitehead differs from Dewey whose reliance upon 
the efficacy of scientific method is more complete . 
The real world can only be understood insofar as its 
complex relationships are known. The notions attempting to 
express these relations oversimplify them. As the notions 
1. ~. , P• 203 . 2. ~. , p . 238. 
3 . Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1935), P• 5.--
are passed on they tend to assume an authoritative 
character that demands their acceptance without proof. 
Whitehead calls this the Dogmatic Fallacy. He points out 
that the men who laid the foundation of modern thought 
were rightly dissatisfied with traditional theology 
although "their true enemy was the doctrine of dogmatic 
finality, a doctrine which flourished and is flourishing 
with equal vigor throughout Theology, Science and Meta-
physics."1 
Preconceptions about nature, implicit premises of 
knowledge, accepted and unquestioned notions contribute 
to the Dogmatic Fallacy. Spatial relationship s are assumed 
to be three dimensional, for example, but the dogmatic 
assumption of this aspect of nature, useful as it has been 
in the past, is now becoming dangerous to the advance of 
knowledge. Systematized kn~1ledge has its offering to 
make in proper proportion. The cautionary note is that 
"too many apples from the tree of systematized knowledge 
2 lead to the fall of progress." 
Certainty and exactness are dangerous goddesses to 
woo . To work on the assumption tha t knowledge is completed 
leads to deadening closure. "This dogmatism is the 
1. Ibid., p. 208. 
2. Whitehead, Modes •.• , p. 79. 
15 
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anti-Christ of learning, 111 ~.fuitehead insists. In his 
earliest essay on education "Mathematics and Liberal 
Education" Whitehead maintains that "vague generalities 
are worse than useless, and if we attempt to embody 
abstractions in short, precise formulae, the pupils will 
simply learn them by heart as empty sounds. 112 A pre-
sentation of knowledge based upon the dogmatic fallacy 
assumes formulae can stand on their own as truths. But 
16 
"the effect which we want to produce on our pupils is to 
generate a capacity to apply ideas to the concrete uni-
verse."3 Premises are to be selected primarily for their 
simplicity rather than for their truth because the selection 
ought to be guided by the purposes of the ends in view. 
"Insistence on clarity at all costs is based on sheer 
superstition as to the mode in which human intelligence 
functions. Our reasoning s grasp at straws for premises 
and float on gossamers for deductions."4 
1. Ibid., p. 81. 
2. Whitehead, Essays .•. , p. 177. 
3. Ibid., p. 183. 
4. Whitehead, Adventures ••• , p. 91. 
7 
As his thought deve lops Whitehead places more and 
more emphasis upon the futility of a search for certainty. 
In one of his last printed essays he concludes that 
logic, conceived as an adequate analysis of 
the advance of thought is a fake. It is a 
superb instr ument, but it requires a back -
ground of common sense. • •• The final out-
look of Philosophic thought cannot be based 
upon the exact statements wh i ch form the basis 
of specia l sciences. 
The exactness is a fake. 1 
The solution to the problem of the Dogmatic Fallacy in 
education is again generalized as an aim: "An education 
which does not begin by evoking initiative and end by 
encouraging it must be wrong. For its whole aim is the 
production of active wisdom."2 
2. The Process of Learning 
In America John Dewey, William James, and Charles 
Pierce wer e proposing a new definit ion of truth during the 
1. Whitehead, Essays •.• , p. 96. 
2. Whitehead, Aims •. • , p . 48. In "Education and Self-
Education,~Essays • • • , 166-174) , Whitehead 
cautions students that "ideals which are not backed 
by exact knowledge are mere fluffy emotion, and often 
lead to disas~rous action." And further, "do not be 
content with vague aspirations. Ahvays push on to 
defi nite knowledge." These statements do not deny 
a rejection of exactness. Pupils must beware of 
vagueness while educators must beware of dogmatic 
assertion. 
17 
era when Whitehead was directing his attention to the 
problems of education in England. Pragmatism was to 
affect educational practices in America by revising our 
thinking about learning. If we were to accept a pragmatic 
definition of truth education must be an experimental 
process. No longer could we, in good conscience, pack 
"accepted truths" into our pupil's minds. Dewey's work 
influenced our educational practices directly by re-
defining learning as an element of growth or a process 
rather than a training of latent "powers" in the pupil. 
He says of educa tion that "It is that reconstruction or 
reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of 
experience, and which increases ability to direct the 
subsequent experience. 111 There is a utilitarianism to 
Dewey's ideas about learning found also in wbitehead 's 
conclusions. They agree that knowledge is important to 
the future course of events. Whitehead, however, diverges 
from Dewey in recognizing an intrinsic value in learning 
about the world around us. Knowledge is more than a 
useful tool to take into one ' s future. It leads to under-
standing and this, as with Plato's knowledge of the Forms, 
is a good in itself. 
1. Dewey, John, DemocracG and Education ( New York: 
Macmillan Company, 9'IOj 1930), p . 90. 
The 
18 
1. Self-education 
If we cannot conceive of our schools as loading 
stations for children's minds, what should they be? An 
educational ideal has been current from the dawn of 
civilization: Education should be religious. From 
r onteczuma to Cardinal Cushing there have been and are 
men who would agree, subject to their own interpretation 
of what is religious. Whitehead frames a description of 
the moral and emotional e lements of a religious education 
in concepts so general that sectarianism is transcended. 
A relig i ous education is an education which 
inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises 
from our potentia l control over the course of 
events. ~fuere attainable knowledge could have 
changed the issue, i gnorance has the guilt of 
vice. And the foundation of reverence is this 
perception, that the present hold within 
itself the complete sum of existence, back-
wards and forwards, that whole amplitude of 
time, which is eternity.1 
\.Jhitehead speaks here of "attainable" knowledge. 
The activity of attaining is self-directed for "you 
educate yourselves." A teacher should "make his class 
g lad to be there"2 but he cannot make a pupil interested 
1. Whitehead, Aims • , p . 26. 
2. Whitehead, Essays • , p . 171. 
19 
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in any particular ideas unless the pupil initiates some 
response. Whitehead admonishes the student; "You have 
got to provide your own enjoyment by interesting your-
selves in things which are worth doing and worth think ing 
about."1 A treatment of subject matter should be attempted 
that "creates a disinterested curiousity for knowledge, or 
an appreciation of beauty, enlarges the mind and causes it 
to expand of its own free inward impulse."2 It is little 
wonder that many teachers coping with overcrowded class-
rooms and debilitating schedules as they do in the United 
States today often fail to make students g lad to be in 
class. Nevertheless, if a self- initiated response is 
lacking no treatment of subject matter can help the student 
to learn. 
ii. Motivation 
Students often are poorly motivated to learn because 
educators fail to offer them the k ind of knowledge that 
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"has peculiar reference to the life of the being possessing 
it."3 But even pertinent knowledge has to be used as soon 
as possible for as Whitehead aptly comments, "Knowledge does 
not keep any better than fish."4 Initia tive is intimately 
1. Ibid. , p. 173. 2. Ibid., p. 23. 
3. Ibid., p . 171-172. 4. Ibid., p. 102. 
connected with the kind of experiences the student has. 
Not only must he feel a sense of discovery in learning, 
but he must also feel the importance his knowledge has to 
h is own life. Whitehead again generalizes : 
Education should begin in research and end in 
research. After all, the whole affair is 
merely a pr eparation f or battling with the 
immediate experiences of life, a preparation 
by which to quali fy e ach immediate moment 
with relevant ideas and appropriate action . 1 
The student whose school experiences prove to him that the 
knowledge he acquires there affects his immediate future 
enjoy s his education. He has the interest that "is the 
sine qua non for attention and apprehension. 112 He wants 
to learn because he is aware that "educa t ion is the 
discipline for the adventure of life."3 
To awaken awareness in the s t udents of a sense of duty 
to the future is not an easy task . Whitehead insists t hat 
" the pupils have got to be made to feel tha t they are 
studying something , and are not merely executing intellect-
4 
ual minuets." One difficulty of many curricula is their 
1. Ibid., p . 48. 2. Whitehead, Aims . . . ' 
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p . 48. 
3. Ibid., p . 16. Cf. Dewey, Democracy ••• , p . 84 . The 
essence of educa tion is "vita l energy seeking opportunity 
for effective exercise." 
4. Ibid., p . 21. 
"fatal disconnection of subjects." Students cannot grasp 
the interconnections of the ideas thus presented. They 
do not understand the relation of these apparently random 
ideas to life which they perce ive as a whole. This leads 
to confusion about the importance of the present and a 
weakening of the ability t o apply ideas. The solution pro-
posed by Whitehead is tha t "you may not divide the seamless 
coat of learning. What education has to impart is an 
intimate sense for the power of ideas , for the beauty of 
ideas, and for the structure of ideas. 111 
iii. Rhythm 
A maturing child may loose his natural desire to learn 
unless his formal education is guided by peop le who under-
stand tha t gr~vth is a cyclical process . It is a myth to 
conceive of the transition from ignorance to wisdom as 
linear and proceeding at an even pace. Whitehead confe sses 
that the evidence is "complex a nd difficult" to interpret 
and tha t he may have misconstrued the phenomena. Never-
theless, he must enforce the main point: "It is that the 
development of mentality exhibits itself as a rhythm 
involving an interweaving of cycles, the whole process 
1. Ibid., p .2l. 
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being dominated by a greater cycle of the same general 
character as its minor eddies."l The term rhythm is 
chosen "as meaning essentially the conveyance of difference 
within a framework of repetition."2 
(1) Romance. To understand the cycles of learning one 
can compare them with Hegel's dialectic process3 although 
Whitehead does not himself make the comparison. Hegel 
describes change as a continuous, three phase, rhythmic 
progression. There is no beginning to the process as a 
whole but one can break into it at any point to analyze it. 
Whatever existent one chooses to focus upon Hegel names the 
"thesis." All that is not the thesis is the "antithesis." 
Change occurs when the two opposites confront one another, 
affect one another and thus bring about the final phase, the 
"synthesis." The identity of both thesis and antithesis are 
not lost in the synthesis though both attain a different 
mode of existence. The synthesis, a unit brought about by 
diversities affecting one another is in turn a thesis, 
though of greater compexity now than were either the first 
thesis and antithesis upon which we focussed attention. 
1. ~·· p. 39. 2. Ibid., p. 29. 
3. See J. Loewenberg (ed.), Hegel Selections (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. iX-xviii. 
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The Hegelian "thesis" or initia l phase of process, 
Whitehead renames the stage of romance. This is the 
receptive phase of learning . 'fuitehead calls it "the stage 
of first apprehension." Facts are perceived during this 
s tage as nearly devoid of relationships to one another. 
They are clothed in the vividness of novelty. They agitate 
the mind because they bear with them the import of their 
unexplored relationships. A romantic excitement is 
awakened. The ferment is, in essence, unsystematic. Of 
itself, this stage , whether a minor eddy or a great stage 
of gr mvth, provides \vhat is more a prerequisite of knowledge 
than knowledge itself in any developed sense of the word. 
It offers datum for thought pregnant with the poss ibilities, 
half-hidden, half-disclosed, of the relationships tha t 
bring discrete facts together into coherent, systematic 
knowledge. 
(2) Precision . The excitement generated during the 
stage of r omance is a natural goad to the student's 
motivation to learn. If this is understood, the Hegel ian 
"antithesis," renamed the stage of precision by Whitehead, 
is initiated at t he proper time. "Education must 
essentially be a setting in order of a ferment already 
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stirring in the mind. ul 
,, \\ 
~ihen the mind is ready a conforn~l 
stage should follow. Facts are arranged according to a 
system so that the previously felt relationships between 
them become explicit and paramount. Techniques of analysis 
taught at this time may be used immediately for there is 
somet hing to analyze. In the sense of a direct opposite, 
t h is stage is not an antithesis for facts are still added 
but now "they are the facts which fit into the analysis. 112 
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The stage of romance as acted upon by precision subordina tes 
it without obliterating it. 
Whitehead conceives of the educator~ role during this 
stage as "forcing on the student's acceptance a g iven way 
of analyzing the facts, bit by bit."3 That f ormal educat i on 
has a role to play primarily centering upon precision must 
not blind us t o the need t o be concerned with the prelude 
to precision as well as to the fruits of the whole process. 
It is, nevertheless , strange to notice \~hitehead's us e of 
the verb force in t his connection. Up to n mv it would 
seem that the learning process functions as a natural 
element of human growth. How v ain to e s t ablish vast systems 
1. Ibid., p. 30. 
3. Ibid., p. 30. 
2. Ibid., p . 30. 
26 
of education if this is so. But self-development, although 
the basic characteristic of learning, needs to be channelled 
if the fullest human potentialities are to be realized. 
Precision is the grammar of thought. It is the organizing 
element. Ideally when the student is ready for it, 
acceptance of discipline will come. It v7i 11 be the 
"voluntary issue of free choice." Whitehead, in discussing 
social relationships proposes that "a doctrine as to the 
social mingling of liberty and compulsion is required."! 
The healthy civilization and the effective teacher rely 
upon persuasion rather than upon force but neither recognize 
mere unqualified claims for liberty. When compulsion is 
needed it must be used. 
(3) Generalization. Hegel ' s final phase of process 
is Whitehead's stage of generalization. He describes it 
as 
a return to romanticism with the added 
advantage of classified ideas and relevant 
techniques. It is the fruition which has 
been the goal of prec i se traini ng . It is 
the f inal success.2 
It is not, however, an end of education. As Hegel 's 
synthesis becomes the thesi s of further change, the stage 
1. Whitehead, Adventures .•• , p. 71. 
2 . VJhitehead, Aims . . . , pp. 30-31. 
of generalization is also a beg inning. The fruition is 
both goal and ground for a fresh start. 
In recognizing that educational growth is rhythmic 
in character much is explained. If the natural chronology 
of academic subjects is based upon a criterion of 
ascending diff iculty the infant's task of learning to 
s peak would, for example, be impossible. 1 Nature dictates, 
on the contrary, that some of the hardest learning tasks 
precede the easier ones because they are essential to life. 
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Effective education requires that subject matter and methods 
of study be adjusted to the needs of life and they are 
rhythmic cravings. 
Roughly speak ing , human growth is divisible into 
three main stages. The first, infancy, is characterized 
by the craving for romance. Whitehead supposes that the 
end of primary school education closes this phase. The 
1. Arguments that speech is not learned or taught are 
answered by Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 
(New York: The New Amer ican Library, [T942~9~, 
pp . 94-127. She records scientific data and 
observat ions leading to the conclusion tha t "language, 
though normally learned in i n f ancy without any com-
pulsion or formal traini ng , is none the less a 
product of sheer learning , an art handed down from 
generation to generation, and where there is no 
teacher there is no accomplishment," p. 98. 
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period of secondary school education is dominated by 
precision . Laws of science, grammatical analyses, rules 
of conduct, and many other disciplines become important. 
Ado l escence finally evolves into maturity. The stage of 
generalization predominates in higher education. White -
head does not let us forget that within any cycle there 
is no sharp distinction between the three stages. Romance, 
precis ion and generalization are to be found throughout 
any cycle differing only in emphasis. 
iv. Freedom and Discipline 
Educators who understand this rhythmic nature of growth 
are faced with the problem that romance and generalization 
obviously require great measures of freedom while the 
stage of precision is dominated by discipline. The 
ancients scorned mere text-book learning holding up divine 
wisdom as their ideal. It is doubtful that their practices 
realized the goal but nevertheless it was there to inspire 
them. More recently, Whitehead believes, ideals have been 
shorn down to fit with practices. The emphasis is, frank ly, 
on the discipline required for text-book subjects. When 
this is the aim an education begins and ends indiscipline . 1 
1. Whitehead refers to European practices when he writes 
about education in Aims of Education. In America, as 
early as 1896, Dewey was-experiment1ng at the University 
of Chicago with a curriculum for primary ages developed 
out of the children ' s own experi ences. Their purposeful 
activities were directed by the teacher t oward specific 
goals. 
\-lisdom cannot grow from such soil for, "the only avenue 
towards wisdom is by freedom in the presence of know-
ledge."1 
Freedom mus t be available in the first stage of 
learning for it is a time of discovery. Interest, so 
necessary to the desire to learn, is sustained because 
any f act seems interesting in the g low of discovery. 
There is no planned search or particular dnquirey at this 
time to determine what will be perceived. Come what may, 
it is all accept ab le to the romantic. This stage mi ght 
also be termed "assemblage . 112 If t his stage, as part of 
a major or minor cycle, is allowed to be an uni nhibited 
experience there is a natural craving to pass on to wider 
meanings and connections with the facts portend . 
Systematization is not easy. \-lhitehead does not 
minimize the dif ficulty of the student's task especially 
during the great stage of precision. In spite of his 
emphasis upon enjoyment one cannot criticize Whitehead for 
wishing education to be too easy. He remark s humorously 
1. Whitehead, Aims ••• , p . 41. 
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2. Cf. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p. 2. He says, "Philosophy 
can exclude nothing. Thus it should never start from 
systematization. Its primary stage can be termed 
'assemblage:" 
0 
that "in education, as elsewhere, the broad primrose path 
leads to a nasty place. 111 The student \.Yho is successful 
in this stage has a t wofold reward : First, there is the 
enjoyment of having mastered the details and of having 
acquired definite skills. Second, there is the wider 
freedom his knowledge allows him to experience. The main 
danger of this stage of learning is tha t initiative may be 
k illed. The curi~ity that is "a passion for an ordered 
intellectual vision of the connection of events, 112 may die 
in the process of its satisfaction. 
Educators who practice "a fatal disconnection of 
subjects" increase the danger of quelling initiative. 
The rigor of routine becomes more palatable as its need 
can be seen throughout the various areas of the curriculum. 
Discipline must be sensed as va luable to the total program. 
If it is a student welcomes discipline for the eventual 
satisfaction he expects as its reward. His expectation 
will carry him through to the stage of generalization 
where once again discipline is subordinated to freedom. 
Whitehead describes this third stage as 
1. Whitehead, Aims ••• , p. 16. 
2. Ibid. , p . 57. 
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the stage of shedding details in favour of 
the active a pplication of principles, the 
details retreating into subconscious habits .. 
The essence of the stage is the emergence 
from the comparative passivity of being tra ined 
into the active freedom of application. 1 
As in all the other stages, there is still acquisition of 
novel fact in the mode of romance and systematization in 
the mode of precision along with the native application of 
principles. Freedom and discipline are essential to the 
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learning process at any moment of progress. For , as White-
head suggests, "there is not one unique threefold cycle of 
freedom, discipline, and freedom: but ••• all mental 
development is composed of such cycles, and of cycles of 
such cycles . 112 
The dialectic in full operation is the pattern of 
mental g rowth. Learning begins when a human being is born. 
Stagnation and degener at i on may interfere with the 
progression if the emphasis on discipline is too vigorous 
or is ill-timed. Without the f reedom for speculation 
method becomes an end in itself. The fatigue of repetition 
is deadly to the speculative reason. When free dom and 
discipline find a fortunate balance in the growth processes 
1. Ibid. , p. 48. 
2. Ibid., p . 42. 
of an individual the dialect ic does not cease until death. 
Learning is a lifelong process. 1 
3. The Aims of Teaching 
Teaching is a sensitive activity. Some of Whitehead's 
specific recommendations to teachers have been noted. In 
schools their general aim is conditioned by the fact that 
"for long years the major aspect of education is the 
reduction of confusion to order, and the provision of 
weapons for this purpose."2 The notion of a teacher as 
master is replaced in Whitehead by that of the teacher as 
a source of inspiration and an example of excellence. The 
attitude that what a teacher does not know is not kn~1ledge 
is prevalent in the learned world. Unfortunately this is 
an attitude sterilizing imaginative thought and blocking 
progress. 
ii. Subject Matter 
A curriculum is usually foisted ready-made upon 
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teachers. A man or woman is hired to teach General Science, 
or Latin, or some specific subject. The textbook, more 
likely than not, cannot be changed until all the copies of 
1. See vlhitehead' s Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1929 1958), passLm. 
2 . Whitehead, Essays ••• , p. 217. 
it are in tatters. When even the taxpayers could not 
object to new books the teacher is seldom the final judge 
of which text will be purchased . Thus it is, at the moment, 
in American schools. Whitehead, no armcha ir educator, 
recognizes these obstacles to effective teaching but he 
finds them surmountable. For, although a teacher may be 
involved in a curriculum practicing little limita tion of 
content or connection of subject matter, he may still 
present his own subject in a way that displays it as a 
part of the one subject, Life. 
All subjects may lend themselves to exhibiting the 
interconnections of things. The same problem looms within 
all subjects: "To make the pupil see the wood by means 
of the trees. 111 Exposure to particular facts in isola tion 
from one another must always precede the apprehension of 
generalizations. The exposure should be a first-hand 
experience; feel, see, smell the trees tha t make up the 
wood. The teacher who relies enti rely upon books to 
present conclusions and examples to his students is 
33 
denying them the richness of personal discovery . They are 
being undernourished with second-hand experiences. \.Jhitehead 
1. Whitehead, Aims ..• , p . 18. 
complains that "the second-handedness of the learned 
worl d is the secret of its mediocrity. It is tame 
because "it has never been scared by facts."1 He main-
tains that in a ll phases of educgtion a r ev olt against 
second-hand information can be made. He finds the 
scient ific and technical educations of particular merit 
in t his revolt for they should base thought upon first-
hand observation and conclude by transl a ting thought into 
activity. 
(1) Limita tions. Whitehead takes the measure of 
educators and concludes that "the field of acquirement is 
large , and the individual so fleeting and so fragmentary: 
classical scholars, scientists, headmasters are alike 
i gnoramuses."2 The role of teacher as fount of information 
is clearly to be limited. The one subject matter, Life, 
is not so limited, h~vever. Does Whitehead propose 
courses in "citizenship ," "honesty" and other virtues of 
civiliza tion? Definitely not. 3 In the firs t place, 
attitudes are not equivalent t o subjects. ~fuitehead 
1. Ibid. , p. 61. 2 . Ibid., p . 57. 
3. Cf . Jacque~ Bar~uds Teacher in America,(New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1~4 , p. 14) . Rarzun 
agrees tha t "it is impossible to 'teach' democracy, 
or citizenship or a hapoy married life. I do n ot 
say that t hese virtues are not somehov1 conne cted 
with good teaching ••.. They come , not from a 
course, but from a teacher; not from a curriculum, 
but from a human soul." 
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expects a teacher to inspire certain attitudes by his 
example but to teach facts and methods of analysis . 
In the second place, there is knowing and there is dis-
covering. They are not equivalent. vlhitehead says of 
the man of science that "he acquires knowledge to appease 
his passion for discovery. He does not discover in order 
to know , he knows in order to discover."1 The urge to 
discover motivates the learning process but knowledge, 
as its prerequisite, requires that a body of facts be 
mastered. 
Teachers select certain facts from the inn~rable 
ones that might be pertinent. The criterion of choice, 
Whitehead suggests, is the same for facts as for the 
premises to be presented; simplicity and applicability. 
Because the scope of knowledge t oday is vastly greate r 
than it once was does not mean that a student ' s chances 
of becoming an educated man are lower than they were 
formerly. The number of facts awaiting human discovery is 
always greater than is the number of f acts that are known . 
Whitehead insists that it was and it still is the case 
tha t "our knowledge of scientific laws is woefully 
1. vJhitehead, Aims ... , p. 57. 
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defective, and our knowledge of the relevant facts of the 
present and the past is scanty in the extreme. "1 Although 
the student ought to be exposed first-hand to the facts a 
teacher is obligated to limit the number of facts selecting 
only those most apt to provide a base for discovery of the 
interconnections of things . 
Danger lurka in limiting subject matter. Humble as 
we may be about our present state of ignorance it is easy 
to allow a finite scheme of abstractions that does express 
one aspect of the order of things to dictate choices of 
subject matter . In referring to the half-truths expressed 
by religious Qogmas Whitehead points out that we always 
"know more than can be formulated in one finite systematized 
scheme of abstractions . 112 We are reminded again that the 
balance between freedom and arder is delicate . The teacher 
1. Whitehead , Adventures ••• , p. 110. 
2 . tVhitehead , Religion in the Making, in Northrop and Gross 
(ed. ), Alfred North Whitehead , An Anthology(New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1953), p . 521. It is interesting 
to note in this connection that Theodore Brameld, 
speaking in Cambridge, May 27, 1959, differentiated 
between indoctrinating and informing. He maintained 
that religion ought to be taught in public schools as 
information to deepen the students• understanding of 
their own religions . 
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who limits subject matter according to its relation to 
his own scheme of dogmatic "truths" is indoctrina ting. 
The criterion of choice must consider the pupi l so that 
facts pertinent to his life will be presented. 
(2) Applications. Having selected and presented a 
core of facts leading to certain propositions the tea cher's 
next task is t o introduce applicat i ons of the ideas involved . 
First, an idea is to be proved. Whitehead extends the use 
of the meaning of "prove": he means--"to prove its worth." 
The introduction of the idea carried with it a t the beginning 
evidence of validity lent it by the teacher's authority. 
Later, the student should test the truth of the propositions 
embodying the ideas by experimenta tion or logic. Finding 
the proposition true lends importance to the ideas. Under-
standing needs proof, too. ~fuitehead says : 
Unless proof has produced self-evidence and 
thereby rendered itself unnecessary , it has 
i ssued in a second-ra te sta te of mind, pro-
ducing action devoid of understanding . . • • 
' Proof' i s one of the r out es by which self-
evidence is often obtained.! 
Appr eciation of ideas i s ga ined both from proof in the 
logica l mode and f rom pr oof in the pragmatic mode. White-
head suggests tha t if there is any priority of one mode 
over anothe r appr eci a tion by use t akes the edge. 
1. Whitehead, Modes ..• , p . 66 . 
Theoretical subjects require that concrete appli-
ca tions be made concurrently with a short and simple 
exposition of the theory. Whitehead warns that 
t he· consequence of a plethora of ha lf-digested 
theoretical knowledge are deplorable . Also 
the theory should not be muddled up with the 
practfce. The child should have no doubt 
when he is proving and when he is utilizing. 1 
The distinction between proof and use must be made clear 
by the teacher. Whitehead does not depart f rom a 
traditional curriculum to recommend courses in Lifemansh ip 
but he would have it clear that the teacher's duty lies in 
demonstrating the life application of academic subjects. 2 
lt is not enough for\a mathematics teacher, for example, 
t o drill his pupils in the use of graphs. There are many 
facts, live issues t o the pupils, available from the 
social sciences to use in making the gr aphs. Where every-
day pr oblems of the pupils are data for mathematics the 
purely abstract character of the subject is mediated and 
those who found i t too remote to grasp may become familiar 
with the use of it as a tool in their own lives. 
1. t.Jhitehead, Aims •.• , p . 16. 
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2. Cf. Montaigne, Essays (Chicago: Britannica Great Books , 
25, 1952 ) , p. 75. In the sixteenth century , Monta i gne 
is suggesting the same point. He s ays, "The lad will 
not so much get his lesson by heart as he will pr a ctice 
it: he \vill repeat it i n his actions • . . . The 
conduct of our lives in the true mirror of our doctrine . " 
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ii. Style 
whitehead believes that the life of an educated 
person should be characterized by "style". The teacher 
should attempt not only to teach facts but to see that in 
the application of i deas a student 's aim is t~'ards 
excellence. By style, Whitehead means acting with decision 
and economy. The "marriage of thought and action" should 
be an harmonious union . Artists, craftsmen, or scholars 
whose work exhibits style are exemplifying the same 
aesthetic qualities, "namely, attainment and r e straint." 
Excellence, as demonstr ated through style, shmvs its 
usefulness in achieving the good life. Whitehead observes 
tha t 
with style the end is attained without side 
issues, without raising undesirable 
inflamations. With style you attain your 
end and nothing but your end. \· ith style 
your power is increased, for your mind is 
not distracted with irrelevancies, and you 
are more likely to attain your object. 1 
St y le is achieved only through s pecial ization. 
Whitehead finds English secondary education in 1916 
"rigid" in producing "the expert without loss of the 
essential virtues of the amateur. 112 Contemporary American 
1. \..Jhi tehead, Aims • • • , p . 24. 
2. Ibid., p . 25. 
) 
40 
secondary education still exhibits this weakness fatal 
to the attainment of style . The teaching of a foreign 
language , for example, usually begins no sooner than the 
seventh grade, introduces the bare bones of the language 
through grammar dri lls and memorization of vocabulary lists. 
A bi-lingual teacher who would introduce the subject through 
the spoken word and by awakening an interest in the 
culture of those who speak the language could sidestep 
rig idity. The flexibility, spontaneity, and relaxed 
attitude of the amateur could be preserved. It seldom is.1 
Later, when four years of sequential courses in the 
language could bring to the pupils the precise knowledge 
of an expert, the other major component of style, most 
high schools offer far less. The rhythmic character of 
growth where freedom and discip line must be balanced 
cannot be i gnored if teachers are to help their pupils 
attain style. 
iii. Wisdom 
"A merely well-informed man is the most useless bore 
on God's earth. 112 It is Ttfuitehead ' s fear that teaching 
1. See James Bryant Conant's Recommendations for Education 
in the Junior High School ( Princeton: Educational 
Test1ng Service:-T960) and his The American High School 
Today (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. 1959). 
2. Ibid., p . 13. 
is too often aimed at producing bores. The examination 
system, wherever it is in force , tempts educators to 
cram thei r students with particular information for the 
sole purpose of passing tests. 1 Some educational theorists 
would change the subject curriculum because the methods 
used to eva luate progress in the subjects ask f or facts 
and mastery of content rather than for evidence of growth 
in habits of ef fective thinking . vlhitehead would continue 
to divide teaching tasks according to the classifica tion 
dictated by the division of labor in research. He would 
insist that if the goal, "activity of thought," deter-
mines the methods the pitfall of cramming facts will be 
avoided within a subject curriculum. Aims of teaching , 
not a particular curriculum, determine whether bores or 
men of active wisdom will be produced. 
1. Cf. Oanalq Keene'~ Living Japan (New York : Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1959), p . 167. Keene illustrates 
Whitehead's contention in pointing out that the 
strength of the militarists in pre-war Japan was 
due to the f act that "the boy who f ollowed the 
orthodox path, eventually graduating f rom • • • 
the Law Department of Tokyo University, could 
confidently expect a successful career. Unfortu-
nately, however, the product of this system was 
often no more than a man with a talent for pass ing 
examinations based on f actua l knowledge." 
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Wisdom characterizes the civilized mind. It is well 
within the scope of the traditiona l curriculum to produce 
civilized minds. It can produce minds aware of the vast-
ness and complexity of the universe, aware that the 
obvious, and familiar facts are data for attention but, 
still, not a l l that must be discovered. Awareness of the 
involvement of facts in wider meanings , awareness of the 
values of life raise men from the brute level to that of 
civilization. 
All pupils are not potential civilized or educated 
men regardless of the curriculum in operation. There are 
people who lack the intelligence to attain wisdom. 
Intelligence cannot be equated with wisdom, however. 
Whitehead calls both intelligence and wisdom modes of 
experience. They are not to be separated from each other 
nor from a third mode of experience, instinct. The 
division between these modes is not sharp. Instinct "is 
the mode of experience directly arising out of the urge 
of inheritance, individual and environmental."1 But 
even intellectua l activity is an inherited factor. we do 
not have to make a conscious eff ort t o t h ink. We think 
1. Whitehead, Adventures •.• , p . 58. 
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as naturally as we breathe . Sometimes there is evident 
a "spontaneity of thought which lies beyond routine."1 
There are flashes of novelty experienced by any person 
from time to time. Judgment of the relevance of 
spontaneous thoughts occurs i n the mode of wisdom. White-
head also uses the term Reason to describe the activity of 
eva luating novelty. 
Habits of body and habits of mind determine much of 
our day to day behavior . They cannot be overlooked in 
the training of children. They, too, should be channeled. 
Often times, however, developing habits of body and mind 
becomes an educational end in itself. Then there is no 
room for Reason. Habitual behavior is repetitious 
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behavior where no method for dealing with novelty is 
1 
needed. Methodology must be able to deal with spontaneous 
thoughts, novel experiences or we sink back to the level 
of the other primates. The only limitations wisdom should 
have to bow to are the limits set by inherited factors. 
Tdhen wisdom functions a decision is made to determine "the 
mode of coalescence of instinct with intelligence ."2 
Neither ideas nor habits dictate our behavior exclusively. 
1. 
2. 
~hitehead, Function . 
Whitehead, Adventures 
. . ' passim. 
, p. 59. 
u 
I 
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They each share a part of the burden. Their harmonious 
coalescence depends upon reason limited by each individual's 
i nherited ability to apply reason . The inheritance i s both 
genetic and environmenta l. Parents provide the one, 
limiting the degr ee of wisdom attainable by any one person. 
Schools are an important f actor in the environmental 
limit a tions to the a ttainment of wisdom. Their duty lies 
in furthering civilization by providing the balance of 
freedom and discipline that leaves room for speculation 
while tra ining a child to the habits of excellence demanded 
for style. 
4. Summary 
For Whitehead , student's needs, interests and patterns 
of growth must dete rrninP the educational progr am. The 
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imagination, and develop balanced judgment if its total 
value is exhibited through the interconnection of a few 
subjects taught thoroughly. Life, seen as an adventure 
into novelty, demands a broad tolerance for new premises 
and ideas. The stifling cloak of dogmatism must be 
lifted. The student's needs and interests walk hand in 
hand for both grow out of the demands life makes to act 
in the present which is holy gr ound . 
Patterns of gro\vth are seen by Whitehead as cyclical 
progressions germinating in freedom, developing through 
discipline and flowering in a wider freedom. Hard work 
is necessary during the wider stage or any of the minor 
eddies of precis ion. Enjoyment of learning is possible , 
even necessary, at any stage of development. The student 
interests himself in the subjects he is studying although 
the teacher must also try to make him glad to be there. 
The ferment gener ated during the process of assemblage is 
to be set in order by the educational program. The 
discipline required for this is welcomed by the student 
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who is aware of his responsibility as a self-determining 
entity. Experience is recons tructed in the interest of 
attaining wisdom, the "art of the utilization of knowledge." 
b 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE COSMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PROCESS 
1. The Ontological Principle 
A phi losophy of education requires a metaphysical 
foundation. 1 It is not enough to recognize that educa tion 
is an experiential activity. The facts and theories con-
tributed by science are not enough even though they may 
describe the learning process, they may explain motivation, 
and they may indicate many useful teaching methods. They 
are, nevertheless, fragmentary. Scientific theories c an 
describe aspects of reality but there are other human 
interests without which the picture is incomplete. The 
inclusive synthesis of ideas of a metaphysic is needed in 
the fina l analysis to jus tify the criteria employed in 
determining s pecific educational pr actices. 
Whitehead ' s interests over the years broadened to 
include the universe, va st unfathomable , but open to human 
s peculation. Plato, whose thought cast its shadow over all 
subsequent Western notions, developed a cosmology. His 
1. See William I<;. Frankena , , "Toward a Philosophy of the 
Philosophy of Education," Harvard Educa tional Review, 
26 (1956 ) , 94-98. Frankena conceives of an adequate 
philosophy of education as involving three activi ties; 
the speculative, the normative, and the analytical. 
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Timaeus inspired wnitehead to frame "a system of ideas 
which bring the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests 
into relation with those concepts of the world ·~.-1hich have 
their origin in natural science."1 The framework is to 
be comprehensive leaving no problem for discussion. The 
particular topic, education, throws light on this scheme 
and, in turn, the scheme elucidates the process, validating 
proposed educational practices. 
Apart from an appeal to ontology Whitehead does not 
believe that e pistemological problems can be solved. In 
criticizing Descartes and Leibniz he insists that "the 
very possibility of knowledge should not be an accident 
of God 's goodness; it should depend on the interwoven 
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nature of things."2 The ontologica l principle of the organic 
philosophy discloses the interweaving as an activity that 
makes the present moment. Subjects experiencing their 
environment are actualizing potentialities and "apart from 
the experience of subjects there is nothing, nothing, 
nothing , bare nothingness."3 A philosophy of education 
cannot accept the ontological principle a t its f a ce value. 
1. Whitehead, Process . • . , p. vi. 
2 . Ibid., p. 289. 
3. Ibid., p. 254. 
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What can one tea ch if outside of the experience of the 
present there is nothing? Whitehead insists t hat the 
present is impoverished from neglect of the past and the 
future. The difficulty vanishes if the word "is" means 
"occurring ." In this sense the past "is" nothing , the 
future "is" nothing. 
1. Category of the Ultimate 
More serious diff iculties become evident on closer 
examination of this statement of the principle. "The 
experience of subjects" is a phrase requiring exp lanation. 
Again a little word is in question; "of" seems to imply 
tha t subjects are lurking about without experiences waiting 
for activity to actualize them. Philosophers have been 
v7restling wit h notions of substance since the dawn of 
history . The naive grant tha t things exist. Subtler minds 
seek a substr atum f or existence . They ask, ~· hat is a 
thing t ha t it should have existence? Aristotle's existence? 
Aristotle's "primary substance" was an acceptable exp l an-
ation for centuries. Whitehead rep laces it with his 
Category of the Ultimate. 
The ultimate metaphysical princip le is the 
advance from disjunction to conjunction , 
creating a novel entity othe r t han the 
entities given in disjunction. The novel 
entity is at once the togetherness of the 
' many ' which it finds, and also it is one 
among t he disjunctive ' many ' which it l eaves. 1 
The notion of advance r eflects the early intuit ion of man 
tha t "all things flow." It equates actua lity with process. 
Process is constituted by an act of becoming o f the 
"one." There are t wo species; macroscopic process and 
microscop ic process . Whitehead explains t hat 
the former process effects the transition 
from the ' actual ' to the 'merely real'; and 
the l atter pr ocess effects the growth from 
the r eal t o the actua l. The former proce ss 
is efficient; the l atter process is teleo-
logica l. The future is merely real, without 
being actual; whereas the past is a nexus 
of actualities.2 
The microscopic process commands our attention first for 
by examining it we can understand wha t subjects are and 
what consti tutes their experiences apart from which there 
is nothing. 
Creativity characterizes all actual t hings. It is 
not "an external agency with its own ul ter ior purposes. u3 
It is a generic activity. Individual entities are a ctual 
by virt ue of their own activity of becoming . The self-
forming activity of an actuality is an individual form 
of the generic activity . \Vhitehead proposes tha t the 
1. Ibid., p . 32. 2. I bid., p . 327 
3 . Ibid., p . 339 . 
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synonymous terms "thing, " "being , " "entity" involve the 
notions of "creativity," "many," "one. "1 These notions 
are ultimate. They are expressed concretely only as 
individual instances. In the philosophy of organism the 
ultimate exists by virue of the act ivity of individuals 
rather than, as in other philosophic theories , by virtue 
of its accidental embodiments . The question here is not 
How do things have existence? It is, In what way is 
existence expressed as things? 
ii. Subjects 
Whitehead 's theory of knowledge is based upon a sub-
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jectivist principle , reformed and reinterpreted from that of 
Hume ' s . The ontological principle indicates that "the 
whole of the universe consists of elements disclosed in 
2 
the analysis of the experience of subjects." To under-
stand what Whitehead means by a subject we must turn to 
certain of his categories . 
(l) Actual occasions . The first category of exist-
ence names "Actual Entities (also termed Actual Occasions), 
or Final Realities , or Res Verae ."3 These are on the 
l. ~· · p . 31. 
3 . Ibid., p. 32. 
2. Ibid. , p . 252 . 
receiving, acting, or subjective side of the ledger. Their 
becoming is individualization of process. The actual 
world is process. The creatures of the world are actual 
entities. There are no other acting creatures. They are 
the atomic units disclosed by analysis. "Actua l occasions--
are the final real things of ,...;hich the world is made up': 1 
Like the atoms of physics each is unique in the sense 
of being singular though not different from others in the 
type of activity that each embodies nor in the method of 
be coming each pursues. These multitudinous drops of 
experience, as one might call them, compose the real 
world. Considering each as a unit of process they use as 
grist for the mill the many entities preceding them in time. 
The satisfied non-acting entities of the past are the 
environment of an acting creature. They are essential to 
the functioning of an entity. Whitehead, in objecting to 
Descartes' notion of unessential experience of the external 
world , insists tha t "there can only be evidence of a world 
of actual entities, if the immediate actual entity dis-
l th t . 1 . . . ..2 c oses em as essen 1a to 1ts own compos~t1on. The 
environment of an actual occasion i s not only active in 
1. Ibid., p. 27. 2 . Ibid., p. 219. 
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its nature, it is required for its activity. Whitehead 
says that by introspection "I find myself as essentially 
a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, 
valuations of alternatives, decisions--all of them sub-
jective reactions to the envi ronment as active in my 
1 
nature . ' ' Our knowledge can be knowledge of the external 
world because of the internality of relations between the 
subject and its universe. 
Whitehead further maintains that external relatedness 
is not relatedness at all and, in fact, makes the problem 
of knowledge insolu:ble • He says that 
the classical doctrine of universals and 
particulars, of subject and predicate, of 
individual substances, of the externality 
of relations, alike render this problem 
incapable of solution. 2 
That Whitehead chooses to reject the substance-quality 
conception of reality in favor of the concept of inter-
connectedness leaves us with the question, How i s one 
actua lity "internal" to another? 
(2) Prehensions. In order to understand the 
"internality" of one actuality to another "Prehensions, 
or Concrete Facts of Relatedness," the second Ca t egory of 
Existence, must be explored. In the Cat egories of 
1. 
2. 
Whitehead, Modes •• 
Whitehead , Process • 
. , 
. . 
p . 228 
, p . 88-89 . 
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Explanation \fuitehead says that 
the first analysis of an actual en~ity, into 
its most concret e elements, discloses it to 
be a concrescence of prehensions, which have 
originated in its process of becoming. All 
further analysis is an analysis of prehensions. 1 
Prehension is the term used for a "mode of activity." 
Further analysis of a prehension discloses it to 
involve three factors : 
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There is the occasion of experience within which 
the prehension is a detail of activity; there is 
the datum whose relevance provokes the origination 
of this prehension ; this datum is the prehended 
object; there is the subjective form, which is 
the effective t one ~etermining the effectiveness 
of that prehension . 
To say it otherwise, an actual entity is a subject because 
of its activity; a reception of objects . Anything pro-
voking the receptive activity is an object. The third 
factor is the particular degree of intensity of feeling 
of the object determining its relevance to the subject. 
Because there are two species of prehensions subjects 
can be self-caused. Positive prehensions, called feelings, 
accept data. Since "it belongs to the n ature of a 'being' 
that it is a potential for every ' becoming ' "3 subjects 
1. Ibid . , p. 35. 
2 . Whitehead, ~dventures •• • , p . 178. Cf. his Process • 
• • , Category of Explanation (xi), p. 35. 
3 . V/hitehead, Process • .• , p . 33 . 
would be at the mercy of their environment if positive 
prehensions were their only mode of activity. Even 
allowing for the degrees of relevance contributed by the 
subjective form of the prehension there must be a "not-
feeling" to escape inexorable determinism. The specie 
that "eliminates from feeling" is the negative prehension. 
There is genuine choice between acceptance or rejection of 
each considered datum. 
Positive prehensions are further analysed into two 
kinds; conceptual and physical. Whitehead blames the "bi-
furcation of nature" on the kind of notions that conceive 
of conceptual activity as the only subjective experience. 
He accuses the empiricists, for example, of covering naked 
experience with an "a priori figleaf" thus robbing it of 
objective content. He says that for Berkeley ' s description 
of perception 
we can substitute the concept, that the 
realization is a gathering of things into 
the unity of a prehension; and that what 
is thereby realised is the prehension, and 
not the things. This unity of a prehension 
defines itself as a here and a now, and the 
things so gathered into the grasped unity 
have essential reference to other places and 
other times. For Berkeley ' s mind, I substitue 
a process of prehensive unification.l 
1. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, [1925] 1957),. pp. 101-102. 
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Physical prehensions grasp particular things into the 
unity while conceptual prehensions are "feelings" of a 
different kind of objects, objects similar to universals. 
The prehension of three candles in a candelabra is 
physical while the prehension of a trip licity is conceptual. 
It is evident that the physical activity is gr ound for the 
conceptual for it provides the datum. 
Whitehead's analysis of prehensions carries him into 
greater and greater complexities unnecessary to outline for 
the purposes of this thesis. It is enough to realize that 
his ontology provides for the subject to relate internally 
to objects by means of feeling them: "Feelings are 'vectors;' 
for they feel what is there and transform it into what is 
here."1 The objects are factors in an activity of com-
position that does not alter the historic environment but 
it recreates through feeling the completed activities it 
finds. It does not take away what was. It feels the past 
and the feelings are factors of its own composition. 
(3) Concrescence. Subjects are a process of con-
cretion. Their act of synthesizing diversity is an 
actualization of potentialities. The concrete existence 
1. Whitehead, Process •.• , p. 133 . 
of a subject lasts no longer than it takes for the act to 
be consummated. The event is not instantaneous. There is 
a duration. The duration is not divisible but Whitehead 
believes it can be analyzed. He says that "in a process 
of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in which 
new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in 
antecedent phases."1 
The number of phases involved depends upon the 
simplicity of the grade of occasions considered. For any 
occasion it, "on its subjective side, is nothing else than 
what the universe is for it, including its own reactions."2 
In a sense then, the actual entity is not an individuality 
during the initial phase of its concrescence; its own 
reactions to the datum have yet to be added. In the 
beginning, there must be a purpose, an aim, or a desire to 
act. The initial phase of its concrescence is "a direct 
derivate from God's primordial nature." 3 Whitehead does 
not propose that God determines what an event will be. 
Rather , the phases following this initial one determine 
the nature of the subject. An actual occasion is, as has 
been shown, an act of selection, a synthesis of what is 
important to the occasion. The final phase of concrescence 
1. Ibid., p. 39 
3. Ibid., p. 104. 
2. Ibid., p. 234 . 
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is the satisfaction of the appetition that initiated 
the pr ocess and guided selections in the intermediary 
phases. Whitehead names the satisfied subject the super-
ject. The superject is the subject and the subject is 
the superject in the sense that "the philosophy of organi sm 
presupposes a datum which is met with feelings , and pro-
gressively attains the rmity of a subject."1 
This brief description of the phases of concrescence 
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on the microscopic level exhibits a progression reflective 
of Whitehead's theory of rhythm in the process of learning. 
The phase of romance is a consideration of the entire 
environment presented as an undiscriminated diversity. Pre-
cision sorts the data selecting for feeling by positive 
prehension whatever seems important to the subject in light 
of its initial aim. The subject's reactions , added to its 
incorporation of the environment in its mvn na ture, result 
in an actual interconnectedness of the things initially 
presented. Satisfaction is attained with the stage of 
generalization. Although human perception and thought 
involve complex nexus of the atomic occasions of experi-
ence the analysis of the concrescence of any one event 
1. Ibid., p . 234. 
indicates t he direction of growth. Whitehead expects a 
genuine learning experience to culminate in an under-
standing of the connections of things. To a im at any-
thing less would deny that concrescence is a selective 
process connecting certain elements of the given in a 
satisfy ing synthesis. To insist that the present is holy 
ground, that education be consummated in the present, that 
the present requires greater emphasis than the past or 
the future is in accordance with the ontological principle. 
Subject matter must seem important; negative prehensions 
will deal with whatever is lack ing in worth to the life of 
the student. The act of concrescence, born in freedom, 
advancing through stages of discipline, dies out free of 
appetition leaving itself as ground for further cycles of 
freedom and discipline. 
iii. Objects 
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Apart from the individualizations of the generic 
creativity there i s nothing, according to the ontological 
principle. What, then, is this ground for further activity? 
Feelings must have objects to feel. Whitehead refers to 
the objects as there. It is hard to reconcile this state-
ment of the ontological principle with the conception that 
something is there. Contemporaneous occasions cannot be 
t he data out there. They have not yet attained sufficient-
ly det erminate characters. Sat isfied occasions are no 
longer active and, in the sense of "existence" described 
by the ontological principle, no longer exist. When 
Hume denied existence to the objective historic environ-
ment he consigned subjective experience to solipsism. 
Whitehead grants an immortality to perished occasions that 
leaves them available to the present . When he says an 
occasion feels what "is" out there he means objects exist 
affectually , although not actively. 
(1) Objectification. The subject-superject perishes 
when satisfaction is obtained. To perish is not, however, 
to vanish. It is to acquire objective immortality. In 
Whitehead ' s words; 
Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, 
while it loses subjective immediacy. It 
loses the final causation which is its 
internal principle of unrest, and it acquires 
efficient causation whereby it is a ground 
of obligation characterizing creativity. 1 
Contemporaneous occasions cannot be data for one 
another. Experience requires endurance. The entire 
environment is considered for feeling. It cannot be 
1. Ibid. , p . 44. 
59 
accepted or rejected instantaneously. While the occasion 
is shaping itself into the satisfied subject-superject it 
is limiting potentialities, it is becoming a definite 
something . Until activity ceases an event is not this 
thing nor that thing. Objects must be determinate things . 
Acting entities become determinate when they perish. Con-
temporaneous occasions can only be related to one another 
indirectly. Although they consider for feeling an historic 
environment and eternal objects of the same order con-
temporaneous occasions limit the vast array of potential-
ities differently, aff ecting the future uniquely. Experi-
ence cannot grasp subjective activity directly . There is 
imuanence of one occasion in another in respect to a 
general substratum of order determined for the immediate 
future by the particula r modes of activity pursued in the 
present. 
(2) Inheritance. The atomicity of the present , the 
brief duration and the self-forming character of subjects 
seem to indicate a discontinuous advance. Whitehead must 
introduce another notion to explain the apparent pre-
servation of identity of large scale objects. Great 
boulders, mountains, our planet and even each man who walks 
about on it seem to endure as distinct entities maintaining 
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varying degrees of identity amid minor changes. vfuitehead 
explains that 
in so far as there is large mutual conformity 
in the data, the energetic form of composition 
is such as to transmit this conformity to the 
issue, thereby preserving that uniformity for 
the future . 1 
If there is a genetic relatedness between occasions they 
are members of one nexus. The members of a nexus inherit 
a defining characteristic. Modes of adjustment are 
repeated especially in events that are not subject to the 
intervention of conceptual mentality. The patterns of 
activity dealt with by physics and chemistry in particular 
exhibit latent mentality and, hence, greater conformity to 
the "laws" of science. 
Real potentiality , or the historic environment of 
events, effects the present by limiting experience to 
feeling what has, in fact, happened. Inherited character-
istics condition events as well . The superjective nature 
has the genera l potentialities to actualize that grant it 
the possibility of novelty, but because of inheritance 
and the state of the world at the moment of activity we 
1. Whitehead, Modes •.• , p. 129. 
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do not observe a chaotic indetermination of the advance. 
Continuity is maintained because there are some obligations 
that are inescapable. Whitehead does not place himself 
in either the camp of those who blame everything on 
inheritance nor of those who insist the environment is the 
sole determining factor . He points out that "the inherited 
status is never a full determination."! Further, in the 
case of human societies, "our dominant inheritance from 
our immediately past occasion is broken into by innumerable 
inheritances through other avenues."2 In any case, 
reactions to initial data are the subject's own so no 
obligations , inherited or environmental, can deny the 
actual occasion its unique way of feeling. "How it deals 
with its data is to be understood without reference to 
any other concurrent occasion. "3 t..Jhitehead further 
insists that "self-functioning is the real internal con-
stitution 
entity. "4 
1. Whitehead, 
2. Ibid., P• 
3. ~lhitehead, 
4 . ~fuitehead, 
It is the 'immediacy ' of the actual 
Adventures . . . 
' 
p • 81. 
243. 
Modes . . . , p • 206. 
Process . , p • 38. 
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(3) Eternal objects. A conceptual prehension was 
described as a feeling of objects like universa ls. White-
head believes that 
the ontological principle, and the wider 
doctrine of universal relativity, on which 
the present metaphysical discussion is 
founded, blur the sharp distinct ion between 
what is universal and what is particular . 
The notion of a universal is of that which 
can enter i nto the description of many 
particulars; whereas the notion of a 
particular is that it is d~scribed by 
universals, and does not itself enter into 
the description of any other particular. 1 
If particulars are actual entities and universals are 
eternal objects the traditional definition of a particular 
is obviously violated by the philosophy of organism. For, 
"an actual entity is present in other actual entities. 
In fact, if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for 
negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity 
is present in every other actual entity. 112 The mode of 
being present is as the subjective form of either a positive 
or nega tive prehension . 
Eternal objects such as sweetness, r edness , goodness, 
etc., are potentially available to any concrescing occasion. 
They can "enter into the description of many particulars." 
1 • Ibid. , p. 7 6 • 2. Ibid., p . 79. 
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To this extent they are universals in the traditional 
sense. There is an import ant difference, however . An 
eternal object is particular as it is immanent in an 
actual occasion. As a potential for realization an 
eternal object may be thought of as a universal but as 
involved in process it is just what it is in respect to 
its relationship to the actual occasion. 
Two kinds of potentiality exist for human experience: 
The real potentiality of historic, settled matters of fact 
and the general potentiality of novelty, of ideals and 
values. The subjective present is the onl y area of 
activity. Yet it requires the past for its activity . To 
insist tha t education cannot either dwell on the past nor 
afford to neglect it is consistent with this ontology . 
Dogma cannot be depended upon to inform the student for it 
depicts the environment as consisting of patterns of 
activity that have not and will not alter. The universe is, 
instead, characterized by a continual advance and the 
advance is adventure into novelty. Real potentialities and 
general potentialities are to be the nourishment, in 
balanced proportions, of the growing , learni ng child. 
s 
2. Perception 
Whitehead paints a world of "prehensive activity," 
"drop s of experience," "eternal objects, 11 and "object-
ified occasions." The depth of analysis reached brings 
us face to face with an Ultimate. Other philosophies of 
education offer no such intoxicating introduction to the 
world within which we must function as educators and as 
students. Whitehead's greatest point of divergence from 
other philosophers of education is in his provision of a 
microscopic view of reality, the world in the making. 
The philosophy of organism is not divided into 
separ a te disciplines; ethics, metaphysics, etc . White-
head's e pistemology must be abstracted from the scheme. 
Perception, as a means of knowing, is fully described by 
the scheme. It is part of the ontology. 
i. Reception 
Perception starts with reception and ends with inter-
pretation. Remembering the details of subjective activity, 
the given is affected by synthesizing activity. The 
initial phases of concrescence are receptive, the later 
interpretative. 
(1) Causal efficacy. In considering organisms as a 
whole we find one type of content of perception is received 
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through the mediation of the body. wbitehead calls this 
mode of perception "casual efficacy." It offers vague 
data felt as coming into experience from the past. This 
is the elemental or primitive form of perception. He 
maintains that "reaction to the environment is not in pro-
portion to clarity of sensory experience. 111 Simple 
creatures exhibit reactions that are vague, "casual," and 
undoubtedly unconscious. Complex creatures are likewise 
dependent upon the body to provide them with the same 
kind of vague, unconscious data. The subjectivist 
epistemologists have concentrated their analyses upon clear-
cut sensa consciously perceived . The bodily functions 
required as mediators between object and subject have con-
fused the subjectivists leading them to concepts that bi-
furcate nature. Whitehead observes that simp le organisms 
lacking the t ype of sense organs required for clear 
sensory perceptions nevertheless react to the environment 
indicating some form of awareness of it. It is this 
bodily awareness that is the initial receptive stage of 
perception. 
1. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p . 154. 
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(2) Presentational immediacy. Whitehead says that the 
other type of content of perception is 
the familiar immediate presentation of the 
contemporary world, by means of our pro-
jection of our immediate sensations, deter-
mining for us characteristics of contemporary 
physical entities . This type is the experi-
ence of the immediate world around us, a 
world decorated by sense-data dependent on 
the immediate states of relevant parts of 
our own bodies . l 
Here clear-cut sense-data are definitely located . There 
is emphasis upon the present with a minimum of reference 
to the past or future . Whitehead objects to the esteem 
this mode of perception has enjoyed in the past . He 
claims that "no philosopher really holds that this is the 
sole source of information: Hume and his followers appeal 
vaguely to 'memory' and to ' practice' in order to supple-
ment their direct information."2 For Whitehead, causal 
efficacy supplies the data for presentational immediacy. 
They cannot be considered separately in an analysis of 
perception . 
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1 . Whitehead, Symbolism, I~s Meaning and Effect , in Northrop 
and Gross (ed.), Alf~itenead, Ari Anthology 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953),-p. 539. 
2 . Whitehead , Process ••• , p . 264. 
ii. Symbolism 
The notion of meaning is a mystery if we confine our 
analysis to the two pure receptive modes. Presentational 
immediacy "merely presents an illustrated portion of the 
presented duration. It thereby defines a cross-section 
of the universe: but does not in itself define on which 
side lies the past, and on which side the future. 111 The 
interpretative experience is especially to be emphasized 
for a philosophy of education, Whitehead calls the mixed 
mode of perception that performs this function "symbolic 
reference." 
An actual occasion's response to the given depends 
upon its grade of complexity. The experience of the 
simplest grade of actual entity is to be conceived as ''the 
unoriginative response to the datum with its simple 
content of sensa."2 Symbolic reference is not a part of 
the experience of simple entities for it requires the 
originative phases that only higher grade occasions dis-
play . The freedom of the later originative phases intro-
duces the possibility for error. Without the functioning 
of symbolic reference the given an actual entity accepts 
l. Ibid., p. 255. 2. Ibid., p . 176. 
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is what it is and remains unrelated to any other given 
that may have been experienced. Symbolic reference "is 
a concrescence in which prehensions in the t wo modes are 
brought into a unity of feeling . "l 
The common components of prehensions in the pure modes 
are fe lt as "common ground." The contribution of either 
mode may tunction as symbol. Error occurs if the datum 
functioning as symbol does not, in fact, apply to the datum 
supp lied as meaning . Whitehead ' s illustration concerns the 
visual datum of a grey stone. The body, as mediator, pre-
sents vague qualities, greyness for one, through casual 
efficacy. Presentational immediacy a pprehends a distinct 
space of greyness. If the subject takes the sensa to mean 
a grey stone over there an interpretation has been made. 
In Whitehead's words: 
What is directly perceived, certa inly and 
without shadow of a doubt, is a grey region 
of the presented locus. Any further inter-
pretation, instinctive or by intellectual 
judgment, must be put down to symbolic re fer-
ence.2 
Perception, as a whole, is a means of knowing the 
external world. Prehensive activity grasps the objective 
world into subjective immediacy. Past experiences, 
available to a subject through objectivation, can be 
1. Ibid., p . 255. 2. Ibid., p . 261. 
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synthesized by symbolic reference with immediate experi-
ence to supply meaning. Knowledge is possible only for 
organisms sufficiently complex to be able to interpret a 
datum as symbol. Even then, the awareness of meaning may 
not be "knowledge" as the term is used by Hhitehead. 
Symbolic reference often takes place at a sub-conscious 
level. The va lue to students of testing ideas is evident 
if symbolic reference is the human mode of supplying 
meaning to experience. 
3. Human Thinking 
Next to the unfortunate effects upon subsequent 
philosophy of the subject-predicate syntax inspired by 
Aristotle's doctrine of primary substance Whitehead 
decries Descarte's dualism of mind and body. His analysis 
of perception, showing dependence upon bodily functions, 
deemphasizing clea r and distinct sense data as sole source 
of meaning is a crusade to put mind and body back together. 
Human thinking , according to the philosophy of organism, 
is to be understood in t erms of the same categories that 
describe a ll other aspects of reality. The dualism that 
finds mental substances external to material s ubstances, 
each n ot requiring the other, is unfortunate f or "it omits 
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the lower forms of life, such as vegetation and the lower 
animal types. These forms touch upon human mentality at 
1 their highest, and upon inorganic nature at their lowest." 
We cannot find, then, a section of Whitehead 's works 
entitled "Psychology."2 We can find a description of the 
ordering of actual entities constituting the kind of 
object a human being is . We can find how these ordered 
societies function as thinking, learning human beings . 
i. Societies 
European metaphysics in confusing actual occasions 
that are real with the real things that endure, that have 
a history, became thwarted. Whitehead sorts out the kinds 
of reality involved. He says that 
a society, as a complete existence and as 
retaining the same metaphysical status, enjoys 
a history expressing its changing reactions 
to changing circumstances. But an actual 
occasion has no such history. It never changes . 
It only becomes and perishes.3 
Whitehead compares his notion of "society" to Descartes• 
1. Whitehead, lodes ••• , p. 204. 
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2. See W. E. Hocking, "Whitehead on Mind and Nature," in P.A. 
Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 
p . 385. "Experieilce, 11 he quotes t/fiitehead, 11does not 
come in compartments. VIe cannot keep the sciences apart, 
still less their objects such as the physical and the 
mental. The thing is, to ~ across in ~ ~· " 
3 . Whitehead~ Adventures ••• , p . 262. 
notion of "substance," finding them analogous. 
Existence is divisible not only into single actual 
occasions but into groups of occasions within which some 
common function is performed by all members of the group . 
vlhitehead explains that "the general common function 
exhibited by any group of actual occasions is that of 
mutual immanence."1 Any group exhibiting at least this 
property of mutual immanence is termed a Nexus . Special 
nexus include contemporaneous occasions that can be 
immanent in one another only indirectly. Temporal nexus 
involve actual occasions relatively past and future to one 
another. These merely Patterned Nexus do not display 
genetic propagation of order. We must look to Whitehead's 
description of a society to find the type of nexus des-
criptive of human existence. 
A person is not a single determinate nexus until he 
dies. While he lives ~vhitehead will say of him that "there 
is no one nexus which can claim to be the society, so long 
as that society is in existence, there is a succession of 
nexus each of which is the whole realized society up to 
that stage of its existence."2 If we view man, as did 
Descartes, as a "thinking substance" he is a society 
1 . Ibid., p. 258. 2 . Ibid. , p. 262. 
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c ons i sting of "a set of contiguous occa sions in serial 
order. u1 \.Jhitehead adds the term "personal" to this type 
of society in v1hich the "realized nexus are purely 
tempora l and continuous."2 Man, as an enduring per-
cipient, is a person. 
The one human being is more than this, though. There 
is a complex of mind and body. Bodily experience is a 
prerequisite for menta l experience. In the normal course 
of events sense-data associated with bodily functions are 
vague, passing unnoticed. Whitehead observes that "no one 
ever says, Here am I, and I have brought my body with me. ,3 
Nevertheless, "thinking substance" is intimately related 
to "bodily substance." ~-Ihitehead outlines the relationship 
in saying tha t 
the body is that portion of nature with which 
each moment of human experience intimately 
cooperates. There is an inflow and outflow 
of factor s between the bodily actua lity and 
the human experience, so tha t each shares in 
the existence of the other. The human body 
provides our closest experience of the inter-
play of actualities in nature.4 
The enduring objects of na ture, organic and inorgani c, 
are societies with personal order. Why are the pyramids 
1. Ibid., p . 263. 2. Ibid., p . 263. 
2. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p . 156. 
3. Ibid., p. 157. 
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different from carrots and carrots different from people? 
Actual entities of the nexus of pyramids are lacking in 
the originative phases. Novelty is introduced, if at all, 
from without. An archeologist picking at a pyramid will 
inter rupt the line of inheritance, will change the history 
of the object, more than it can change itself. Carrots, 
on the other hand, are democratic societies; there is no 
dominant nexus introducing novelty for the whole object 
but the actualities of the society exhibit more mental 
s pontaneity. Man is a hierarchial complex of societies. 
Hhitehead says that 
in a man, the living body is permeated by 
living societies of low-grade occasions so 
far as mentality is concerned. But the whole 
is coordinated so as to support a personal 
living society of high- grade occasions. This 
personal society is the man defined as a 
person. It is the soul of which Plato spoke. 1 
ii. Consciousness 
Prehensions, we noted, involve three factors. The 
third, termed the subjective form, "is how that subject 
2 prehends that datum." In the thirteenth Category of 
explanation Hhitehead lists some of the many species of 
subjective forms: There are "emotions, valuations, 
1. Whitehead, Adventures ••• , p . 267. 
2. Whitehead, Process ••• , p . 35. 
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purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc."1 
Consciousness is a specie of feeling available to only 
the high grade actual entities of the most complex 
societies. Man, as this kind of enduring object, can have 
conscious feelings. But even man experiences most of his 
data with other subjective forms than consciousness. 
Whitehead describes human experience "as a flood of self-
enjoyment, diversified by a trickle of conscious memory 
d . . . . .,2 an consc1ous ant1c1pat1on. For Whitehead, there is no 
supposition that experience can be examined solely by 
"acts of conscious introspective analysis." In a famous 
passage describing the experiences that mus t be examined 
Whitehead begins with "experience drunk and experience 
sober," lists many more experiences and their opposites 
and sums them all up with, "experience normal and experi-
ence abnormal. u3 
iii. Knowledge 
The ontological justification for Whitehead's scorn 
of "mere knov7ledge" lies in his analysis of the subjective 
form. Although consciousness is rare he insists tha t 
1. Whitehead, Essays •.• , p . 91. 
2 . Whitehead, Adventures •.. , p . 290-291. 
3. Ibid., pp- 227-228. 
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all knowledge is conscious discrimination of 
objects experienced. But this conscious dis-
crimination, which is kn~vledge, is nothing 
more than an additional factor in the sub-
jective form of the interplay of subject with 
object. I 
According to the philosophy of organism an education con-
cerned with nothing more than inculcating kn~vledge is 
c oncentr ating upon a very small area of human experience. 
The legitimate cla ims for knowledge must be set in the 
broader context. 
(1) Memory. The learning process is linked with 
memory , at times considered equivalent to it, but always 
requiring its exer cise in some measure . Whitehead does 
not analyze the function of memory specifically . He 
mentions it only in connection with other interests. There 
is no differentiation made between memory as habit and 
memory as recollection. It is evident that if objects of 
pure physica l prehensions are perished occasions the past 
is felt in the present. Whitehead equates this aspect of 
process with both causation and memory. In applying the 
term memory to the act of recreation of the past Whitehead 
does not necessarily refer to conscious recollection. He 
1. Ibid., pp. 227-228 . 
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could as well be describing habit alone. In either case 
students must rely upon both kinds of memory. 
More specifically, conscious recollection seems to 
involve Whitehead ' s Doctrine of the Conformation of 
Fee lings. In Adventure of Ideas he gives an example of 
an angry man whose total emotional reaction consists of 
several separate occasions of experience. The anger is 
continuous from one occasion to another because anger is 
a subjective form that is felt as a sympathy of the later 
occasion for the preceding one. Until something occurs 
t o interrupt the sympathy between occasions, the sub-
jective form of anger is repeated as a non-sensuous per-
ception of past emotion. The feeling of anger must be 
illuminated by consciousness for there to be a conformation 
of feeling occasions. t{hitehead does not actually say that 
the subjective form that is a "conscious discrimination of 
objects," or knowledge, is available to subsequent experi-
ence through sympathy of the later occasion for the former. 
There seems to be no other construction possible to explain 
conscious recollection within the framework of the scheme. 
If ~hitehead is not misconstrued on this matter one wonders 
how the vagaries of memory might be explained . Students 
chewing their pencils in vain attempts to recall some fact 
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supposedly committed to memory before the test might well 
ask, Why is there no sympathy now for that subjective form 
of my past experience? Tl~ torturing effects of a 
traumatic experience tha t cannot be forgotten is more 
fully accounted for. Whitehead says of the doctrine of 
conformal feelings that "the factor of compulsive determin-
ism in the Universe depends on this princip le."1 
(2) Anticipation. The f uture, as tvell as the past, 
is an obje ct for the activity of subjects. Common sense 
informs us that the immediate future shading as it does 
into the present "is immanent in the present with some 
degree of structural definition."2 We are more concerned 
in the way in whi ch less immediate occa sions affect con-
crescence. It is evident future occasions cannot be 
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i mmanent in the present in the same way a s are past occasions. 
The future is immanent in the acting entity as anticipation. 
There is a creative urge arising t hrough phases of integr at-
ion and reintegration of prehensions that cont r i butes an 
enjoyment of the role the superject will play . For this 
reason Whitehead ' s universe does not lack purpose . He 
says that 
1 . Ibid., p. 326. 2 . Ibid., p . 247. 
in the formation of each occasion of actuality 
the swing over from re-enaction to anticipation 
is due to the intervening touch of mentality. 
Whether the ideas thus introduced by the novel 
conceptual prehensions be old or new, they have 
this decisive result, that the occasion arises 
as an effect facing its past and ends as a 
cause facing its future . In between lies the 
teleology of the Universe.l 
(3) Judgment. A proposition, also termed theory, 
functions during the subjective experience primarily as 
"a lure for feeling." Propositional feelings arise in the 
later phases of concrescence as a function of the mental 
pole. A proposition consists of a predicate and a logical 
subject existing in the mode of the possibility that an 
actual subject corresponding to the logical subject is 
characterized by one or more eternal objects corresponding 
to the predicate of the proposition. 
It is not necessary that the truth or falsity of a 
proposition be determined for it to function as a lure for 
feeling. If there is a prehension integrating and deter-
mining the conformity or lack of it of the proposition 
and an objectified nexus its subjective form is a judgment. 
There may, in fact, be conformity or there may not but the 
judgment cannot be criticized by the subject making it. In 
any case, it is true or false only in respect to that 
1. Ibid., p . 249. 
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subject and its universe. A judgment made at one time in 
history may be false . The same judgment may be true at a 
later date because circumstances have changed. In any 
case if there is a judgment it "enters, as a value, into 
the satisfaction of that subject. 111 
Uhitehead's technical use of the term consciousness 
required an introduction of the above notions. We cannot 
end a discussion of human thinking until it is understood 
that 
a felt 'contrary' is consciousness in germ. 
When the contrasts and identities of such 
f eelings are themselves felt, we have 
consciousness •.•. Consciousness requires 
more than the mere entertainment of theory. 
It is the feeling of the contrast of theory, 
as mere theory, with fact, as mere fact. 
This-cQntrast holds whether or-no-the theory 
be correct.2 
Theory and fact meet in experience before we can speak of 
knowledge . Education cannot neg lect either theory or 
fact. Human experience on the conscious l evel will contrast 
theory with fact no matter how weighted one side or the 
other one's l earning experiences might be. 
While memory and anticipation contribute many of the 
objects of knowledge, Whitehead conceives of an even more 
important role for them. If human beings aspire to pull 
1. \-lhitehead , Process • • . , p. 291. 2 . Ibid., p. 286. 
80 
themselves up by the boot-straps the proposed evolutionary 
role of memory and anticipation might well be pondered . 
He says that 
when memory and anticipation are completely 
absent, there is complete conformity to the 
average i nfluence of the past . There is no 
conscious conformation of memory with the 
possibility. Such a situation produces the 
activity of mere matter, When there is memory, 
however feeble and short-lived, the average 
influence of the immediate past, or future, 
ceases to dominate exclusively • • • Thus 
the universe is material in proportion to 
the restriction of memory and anticipation. 1 
To purposely make use of memory and anticipation in our 
judgment is to further the creative advance of spirit-
uality. An education that balances the demands of the 
past with the possibilities of the future emphasizes the 
"art of the utilization of knowledge." 
4. Summary 
The organic universe of Whitehead's cosmology is 
experience advancing from disjunction to conjunction. 
Concrete reality is subjective activity individualizing a 
generic creativity. The organic philosophy is, in one 
sense , a comprehensive e pistemology for analysis of 
actuality discloses a mode of activity, prehensions, 
1. Whitehead , Essays ••• , p. 91 . 
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subjectively synthesizing an objective world. The con-
crescing entity aims at satisfaction of a creative urge 
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and upon attaining satisfaction ceases to act. Perished 
actual occasions are potential objects for subsequent 
activity. Continuity is explained because of the obligation 
the objectified world of entities p laces on the present and 
because there are inherited characteristics among grouped 
occasions. The notion of universal and particular is 
replaced by eternal object and actual occasion each par-
taking of some traditional characteristics of both 
universal and particular. These two types of existences 
are more determinate than are any other types. 
Human thinking is explained by the same categorical 
scheme. Perception begins with two receptive modes; the 
body presenting vague sensa through causal eff icacy and 
the reception of distinct sensa through presentational 
immediacy. Neaning is supplied in experience by the datum 
of either mode of reception acting as symbol during the 
further activi ty of the interpretive act called symbolic 
reference. Perception is not peculiar to human beings . 
They do not differ in kind from other enduring objects. 
All are societies exhibiting personal order. Man does 
differ from some in that he is a hierarchial society 
supporting a nexus of high grade occasions that direct his 
attack upon his environment. The actua l occasions of this 
nexus can exhibit prehensive activity with the subjective 
form of consciousness when there is a felt contrast between 
theory and fact. Little of man ' s experience is in this 
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form although his knowledge is conscious. ~~mory and 
anticipation function to offer him experience in the present 
of both the past and the future enabling him to deal more 
effectively with his environment. He can judge possibilities 
and whether his judgment is correct or not it enters his 
n a ture a s a v a lue. 
CHAPTER IV 
VALUES IN THE PROCESS 
1. The Sources of Values 
It is generally agreed among contemporary philosophers 
that at least some values must be considered in determining 
educational practices. A philosophy of education must criti-
cize and propose normative goals as well as study the elements 
of education• Broudy, for example, in the development of his 
philosophy, analyzes and defines the specific values of self-
integration, the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious. 
He finds the source of values to be "in the rela tion between 
1 the structure of things and the structure of human nature." 
John S. Brubacher, although he does not develop a unique 
synthesis, does highlight the normative aspect of each of the 
philosophies he describes. He complains that in practice 
"too few educators have any underlying theory of values which 
they can consult to give them some degree of consistency in 
1. Harry s. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education 
(New York: Prentice-Hall~ Inc., 1954)-,-p. 291. 
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handling their succession of varied duties."1 He further 
insists that there is a hierarchy of values although there is a 
marked divergency of opinion as to which values are supreme. 
Clearly stated sources of values are seldom provided. 2 
John Dewey offers no metaphysical system from which partie-
ular values stand out as necessary. He proposes that the sci-
entific method of testing hypotheses can be applied to the dis-
crimina tion of values. Intrinsically worthwhile activities and 
purposes are thus discernable. 3 
Whitehead does not have to consider values in education as 
a problem apart from his cosmology . For him, 
value is inherent in actuality itself. To be 
an actual entity is to have self-interest •••• 
The value of other things, not one's self, is the 
derivative value of being elemezts contributing 
to this ultimate self-interest. 
i. Evaluation 
In a world of atomic process the question arises as to 
how one can conceive of values a s existing a part f rom exper-
ience. The source of values is not a s obvious where the reform-
1. Modern Philosophies of Education (New York : McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc.,-r950), p. 92. 
2. Ibid., p. 96. 
3. Cf. his Democra cy and Education (New York : The Macmillan 
Company, [1916] 1~), pass1m. 
4. Whitehead, Religion ••• , p. 504. 
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ed subjectivist principle determines the ontopogical principle: 
"Apert from things that are actual , there is nothing -- nothing, 
either in fact or in efficacy."l We must not take Whitehead's 
statement to mean that only the sensible furniture of our world 
is actual . The whole gamut of values available to the acting 
human being for realization exists as a characteristic of one 
actuality, God. Likewise , all actual occasions exhibit values 
as characteristics. Human being~ can be motivated by ideals . 
Eternal objects , functioning as aims in the proce ss of self-
determination, exist as potentialities or in an "ideal" form 
in the Platonic sense. 
The organic philosophy is very concerned with value . 
Whitehead' s universe is characterized by it . He says , "Every-
thing has some calue for itself , for others, and for the whole . 112 
It is important to understand in more detail what is meant by 
this statement in order to discover what the sources of value 
are in Whitehe ad ' s cosmology. This will require further dis-
cussion of the process of concrescence . 
(1) Potentiality. The entire universe of an acting 
entity is considered during concrescence . Prehensive activity is 
l . Whitehead, Process • • • , p . 64 . 
2. Whitehead, Modes • • • , P• 150 . 
1 
faced with an infinitude of potentialities for actualization. 
Whitehead describes the subject-superject as "a synthesis of 
being and not-being, 111 because entities rejected from feeling 
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through negative prehensions nevertheless affect the synthesis. 
Negative prehensions also have subjective forms. It is the 
subjective form of a negative prehension that becomes a part of 
the nature of an acting subject. The entire universe of an enti-
ty is, in this way, evaluated. 
Data for activity exists only as potentiality. 2 The infin-
itude of potentialities does not become incarnate in each drop 
of experience. Only that part of the objective universe limited 
by an actual occasion's determinate feeling of it is involved 
in process. Whitehead observes that "the infinite has no prop-
erties. All value is the gift of finitude •••• infinitude 
is mere vacancy apart from its embodiment of finite values."3 
In the organic philosophy we cannot expect Goodness or Truth or 
Beauty to be found apart from their exemplification in some 
1. Whitehead, Science • . . , p. 234. 
2. D. Bidney criticizes this notion in "The Problem of Sub-
stance in Spinoza and Whitehead" (Philosophical Review, 
45 [1936], 591). He argues that it is "intrinsically im-
possible and unintelligible to derive the actual from the 
potential." A. H. Johnson answers in "A Criticism of D. 
Bidney' s Spinoza and Whitehead" ( Phil . Rev., 47 [1938], 
413). 'Whitehead does not attemp~o derive the actual 
from the potential~ ---
3. Whitehead, Essays ••• ,pp, 105-106. 
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actual entity. They are potentials for realization, not from a 
separate realm of existence, but as immanent in the primordial 
nature of God. 
The doctrine of objective immortality indicates the way in 
which everything has some value for others. The value a thing 
has for others as a potential datum may be negligible as it is 
if the objectified entity enters the experience of a subject 
only through negative prehension. It may be more intense but in 
any case the objective universe exists as potentiality for value 
realization. 
(2) Actuality. Earlier it was stated that positive pre-
hensions are feelings of what is of worth to the actual occasion. 
More specifical l y, the intermediate phase of concrescence 11 i s 
a ferment of qualitative valuation."1 Enjoyment of its exper~-
ence characterizes the evaluative activity. Vivid experience 
heightens enjoyment. Appetition aims at vivid experience. A 
brief introduction here of Whitehead's concept of a supreme be-
ing is necessar y to discover the source of a subject's aim. He 
says that 
its actuality is founded on the infinitude of 
its conceptua l appetition, and its form of pro-
cess is derived from the fusion of its concep-
tual appetition with the data received f rom the 
l. Whitehead, Adventures ••• , p. 269. 
world-process. Its function in the wortd is 
to sustain the aim at vivid experience. 
The functioning of a supreme being provides the motivation for 
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value realization. Whitehead insists activity must be directed 
from the beginning of the process. The idea of itself as sup-
erject, the creative urge, is a subject's conceptual prehension. 
It is the subjective aim. In Whitehead's words: 
This doctrine of the inherence of the subject 
in the process of its production requires tha t 
in the primary phase of the subjective process 
there be a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: 
the physical and other feelings originate as 
steps towards realizing this conceptual aim 
through their treatment of initial data. 2 
The immanent action of God provides an actual occasion with a 
subjective form that is "the subject's prehension of the pri-
mordial nature of God ."3 This is its aim to act and to make the 
choices that it does make. 
Everything has some value "for itself" because its actua l-
ity is its experience. Whitehead says that "the organic phil-
osophy interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment of 
being one among many and of being one arising out of the campo- • 
1. \{hitehead, Modes ••• , p. 128. 
2. Whitehead, Process ••• , p. 342. 
3. ~., p. 278. 
1 
sition of many'." Self-enjoyment is further explained by 
Whitehead showing how it is a value. He says that 
actuality is the self-enjoyment of importance. 
But this self-enjoyment has the char acter of 
the self-enjoyment of others melting into the 
enjoyment of the one self. . • • The main 
point of this description is the concept of 
actuality as something that matters, by reason 
of its own self-enjoyment, which includes enjoy- 2 
ment of others and transitions towards the future. 
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Towards the end of his life \<lhitehead seems to modify his 
position. Up to this point there is a definite insistence upon 
the subjective existence of value a s its only @Ode of existence. 
In "Immortality" Whitehead describes two Worlds. He says that 
evaluation involves a process of modification; 
the World of Activity is modified by the World 
of Value. It receives pleasure or disgust from 
Evaluations. It receives acceptance or rejec-
tion: It receives its perspective of the past, 
and it receives its purpose for the future. 
This interconnection of t he two Worlds is Evalj 
uation, and it is an activit y of modification. 
Although this World of Va lue seems very close to Plato 's World 
of Forms, claiming an independent ixistence, the essay further 
describes its status a s "an abstra.ction requiring , for t he com-
pletion of its concrete reality, the factuality of Finite Activ-
. t ,.4 1. y. Whether or not Whitehead has succumbed to Platonism, it 
1. Ibid., p. 220. 
2. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p. 161. 
3. Whitehead, Essays ••• , p. 81. 4. Ibid., p . 92. 
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is evident that the final emphasis is on the characterization of 
activity as an evaluation process eventuating in realization of 
values. The philosophy of organism has been described quite 
rightly as a scheme of "value synthesis." 
(3) Reason. For the purposes of this discussion the wider 
level of human activity must be explored. Unconscious functions, 
physical and conceptual, are evaluative activities. Digestion, 
for example, involves a selection from the foods entering the 
body of the nutritious elements. Likewise, the viewing of a 
scenic panorama is a selective visual experience, partly conscious, 
partly unconscious. Man, as a hierarchial complex of societies, 
has an advantage over less highly organized forms of life for 
ruling his relationship to his environment is the king of his 
being, reason. Man, Whitehead says, is characterized by 11a 
three-fold urge: (i) to live, (ii) to live well, (iii) to live 
better. In fact, the art of life is first to be alive, secondly 
to be alive in a sa~is factory way, and thirdly to acquire and 
increase in staisfaction. 111 
Historically, reason ha s been assigned t wo main roles. 
These reflect corresponding tendencies in history. In The ~-
1. Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 
[1929] 195~ p. 8. 
tion of Reason Whitehead attempts to analyze these roles and 
relate them to one another. 
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Reason, because it is an evaluative process, has a regu-
lative function. In general, it directs man's attack upon the 
environment in which he must grow or perish. Reason promotes 
life. It does so by judging presented flashes of novelty and 
estimating their relevance to appetition. This aspect of reason 
is termed the Practical Reason. From its operation methodol-
ogy is discovered. Necessary as is this pragmatic function, by 
itself it leads to repetition and eventual fatigue. These belong 
to the forces of decay. 
Although decay is a main tendence of history, experience 
also discovers a tendency to creative evolution. Thus the func-
tion of reason in its critical role does not explain reason's 
relation to the originative elements. The Speculative Rea son 
is then proposed. It is that aspect of reason seeking its sole 
satisfaction in the sheer understanding of rea lity. Since that 
satisfaction is never complete the Speculative Reason is unbounded. 
The relation between the two aspects of reason is comple-
mentary. The Practica l Reason organizes and provides the method 
for the attack upon the environment. The Speculative Reason, 
~i~Giplined by method, provides the element of inspiration tha t 
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that draws method away from decay. Reason, as a whole, promotes 
not only life but the good life and the better life. 
ii. Morality 
Whitehead looks at past and present mora l codes and finds 
that they "have suffered from the exaggerated claims made for 
1 them." Their validity, dogmatically asserted, is not to be 
questioned even if codes conflict with one another or even if 
they violate prevalent moral intuitions. The result is that "in 
human society the champions of morality are on the whole the 
fierce opponents of new ideals. Mankind has been afflicted with 
low-toned moralis ts, objecting to expulsion from some Garden of 
2 Eden." The tendency for specific moral codes to be stagnant 
makes them, for Whitehead, a dubious source of value. 
(1) Importance. Codified morality may be suspect; mora l-
ity in itself is not. Whitehead finds the task of philosophy 
to be a moral one. Philosophy, he proposes, can recover the 
totality obscured by selection. 3 The import of this is that 
morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined 
with generality of outlook. The antithesis 
between the general good and the individual 
interest can be abolished only when the indi-
vidual is such tha t its interest is the gen-
eral good, thus exemplifying the loss of minor 
l. Whitehead, Adventures • • • , p. 374. 
2. ~., p. 346. 
3. Whitehead, Process ••• , p. 22. 
intensities in order to find them again with 1 finer composition in a wider sweep of i nterest. 
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Intensity of feeling is in proportion to the i mportance of 
the datum to the concrescing occasion. Whitehead explains that 
importance "is that aspect of feeling whereby a perspective is 
imposed upon the universe of things felt."2 The notion of impor-
tance is not reducible to the notion of perspective although they 
are intimately connected. "It is true to say that perspective 
is the dead abstraction of mere fact from the living importance 
of things felt."3 
Importance is found to be at the heart of Whitehead's defin-
ition of morality. He says, "Morality consists in the control 
of process so as to maximize importance."4 It is evident that 
moral codes may indicate a perspective for us offering greater 
perfection of importance than the perspective indicated by intu-
ition alone. It is the exaggerated status, demanding for the 
codes a literal acceptance of them, that weakens their effect. 
The Biblical commandment to observe the Sabbath is held up 
by Whitehead as an example of a code easily misconstrued. He 
wonders if, for instance, the division of time into days or 
l. Ibid., p. 23. 
2. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p. 15. 
3. Ibid., p. 15. 4. Ibid., p. 19. 
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weeks expresses an absolute factor of existence. He concludes 
that although under ordinary circumstances one may do well to 
behave a s the code commands, "there is no one behaviour-system 
belonging to the essential character of the universe, as the 
universal moral ideal. u 1 
(2) Ideal aims. No transcendental "moral law" exists for 
Whitehead. Although he has been labelled a realist by some, 
Whitehead cannot fully qualify. His universe is subjective; 
experience is the reality. Value-judgments actualize potential 
relationships according to a criterion of importance sometimes 
synonymously termed "interest." Without interest there would be 
no morality but morality that is nothing more than the interest 
of a subject is not moral. There must somewhere be a notion of 
the idea l. Whitehead satisfies this demand. He says, "Mora ls 
consists in the aim at the ideal. 112 The essence of morality 
is a concern for the effect that the present will have upon the 
future. The introduction of novelty is, f or example, a moral 
act. The aim towards vivid experience is abetted for the fut-
ure if the present occasion draws away from the trivial enjoyment 
of mere repetition. Whitehead's proposal that education should 
develop reverence and duty can be better understood in light of 
1. Ibid., p. 20 , 
2 . Whitehead, Adventures ••• , p. 346. 
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his general theory of morality. For him, "The moral code is the 
behaviour- patterns which in the environment for which it is 
designed will promote the evolution of that environment towards 
its proper perfection. "1 
Concern for the future is a moral duty. Reverence for the 
present wherein idea l aims may be realized is an expression of 
morality . \Vhitehead does not need to sort through the pre-
vailing moral codes, judging or qualifying them, to provide an 
axiology for his philosophy of education . Goheen comments aptly 
when he says that "the real burden of Whitehead ' s conception 
of value must , therefore , be borne by his analysis of the event 
as a ' unit of feeling '. " 2 
iii. God 
The source of values is found, then, to be stubborn fact 
actualizing potentiality. The aim to act is from God and sus-
tained by God. Since Whitehead requires a scheme to involve 
only necessary notions, his concept of God must be further con-
sidered, God is a necessary being because experi ence indicates 
1. Ibid., p . 377 . 
2 . Jolm Goheen, ' 'Whitehead ' s Theory of Value," in P. A. Schi1pp 
(ed. ), The Philosophy£! Alfr ed North \Vhitehead, p. 441. 
a world which is, at least to some extent, ordered. There is 
also novelty to be observed. "Apart from the intervention of 
God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in 
1 
the world." The specific values of civilization entail both 
novelty and order as will be seen. 
What kind of God is Whitehead's? If he is to be real, he 
cannot be other than finite. In addition, Whitehead complains 
that "in the discussion of our deeper experiences, religious 
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and mystic, an unbalanced emphasis has been placed upon the mere 
sense of infinitude."2 God cannot be an infinite creature . He 
is limited by his goodness . "He gains his depth of actuality by 
his harmony of valuation. It is not true that God is in all re-
spects infinite."3 God, because he is an actual entity, is self-
limiting. God is, in this sense, finite. In another sense he 
is infinite for he is everlasting. His "actuality is founded on 
the infinitude of his conceptual appetition. ,A 
Many theologians of the western world describe God as a 
creature entirely transcending the universe. The Hebraic myths 
1. Whitehead, Process • . . , p • 377. 
2. Whitehead, Modes • • . , p • 107. 
3. Whitehead, Religion • . . , p • 525. 
4. Whitehead, Modes . . . , P• 128. 
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of creation require such a being. In the philosophy of 
organism "the secularization of the concept of God's functions 
in the world is at least as urgent a requisite of thought as 
is the secularization of the elements of experience."1 
Experience indicates that there is both permanency and 
fluency in the universe. This presents a dilemma if there is 
no principle of mediation. Whitehead suggests that in "the 
relation of reality as permanent with the reality as fluent: 
the mediator must be a component in common, and not a 
transcendent emanation."2 God as mediator is not outside of 
the universe functioning as a remote "first cause" of creation. 
"Each creative act is the universe incarnating itself as one, 
and there is nothing above it by way of final condition. u3 
But neither is God separate from creativity. We recall 
that "creativity is not an external agency with its own 
ulterior purpose. All actual entities share with God this 
characteristic of self-causation."4 If God is to be a creature 
at all he must be one of creativity. For, according to the 
1. Whitehead, Process . • • 
' 
P· 315. 
2. Whitehead, Adventures • . • , p • 134. 
3 . Whitehead, Process . • • , p • 375. 
. 4. Ibid., p. 339. 
Category of the Ultimate, "'Creativity' is the universal of 
universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact."1 
"Creativity" considered as a potential for realization is an 
eternal object characterized by pervasiveness. An eternal 
object must be immanent in some actual entity to be available 
for realization. A more detailed discussion of God's three 
natures will show that he is "the outcome of creativity," 
"the foundation of order," and "the goal towards novelty."2 
(1) Primordial nature. The ontological principle 
informs us that whatever is apart from t he experience of a 
subject does not exist. The Category of the Ultimate informs 
us that the disjunctive many are one in the nature of a 
subject. A real togetherness of any potentialities requires 
a subject. In God's primordial nature we find the "ultimate, 
basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on 
which creative order depends."3 Eternal objects "subsist" 
in God's primordial nature. They form a pattern of general 
potentiality from which, in the process of concrescence of 
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an actual occasion, eten1al objects are available for temporal 
1. Whitehead, Process ••• , p. 31. 
2. Ibid., p. 135 . 
3. Ibid., p . 48. 
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realization. Concrescence is motivated by an aim. The aim 
"is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevit-
able ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature 
of God". 1 
God, in his primordial nature, is motivated by appe-
titions as are the actual occasions of the world. His, how-
ever, are infinite although they, too, constitute his purpose. 
Because they are primordial they do not seek preservation. 
'~hat i s inexorable in God, is valuation as an aim towards 
'order' . 112 
"Patterning" is descriptive of the teleology of the 
universe. In Whitehead's words, "God, whose existence is 
founded in Value, is to be conceived as persuasive towards an 
ideal coordination."3 In short, "God is the principle of 
concretion."4 
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(2) Consequent nature. The primordial nature of God is 
characterized by pure conceptual prehensions since, in this 
sense, he is the principle of general potentiality. But God 
is, like any actual occasion, also characterized by physica l 
prehensions. The consequent nature is "the physical prehension 
1. Whitehead, Process ••• , p. 373. 2. Ibid., p. 373. 
3 . Whitehead, Essays .•. , p. 90. 
4. Whitehead, Process • • • , p. 574. 
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by God of the actualities of the evolving universe . "1 
God's primordial nature is data for the activity of the 
world while the consequent nature results from the action of 
the world on God. "This prehension into God of each creature 
is directed with the subjective aim, and clothed with the 
subjective form, wholly derivative from his all-inclusive 
primordial valuation. "2 Although 1the primordial nature is 
complete and is not involved with process , the consequent 
nature is , in a sense , temporal and a process . "God is 
to be conceived as originated by conceptual experience with 
his process of completion motivated by consequent, physical 
experience , initially derived from the temporal world. "3 
God is different from all other actual entities in still 
another way. His continuous nature is, in certain respects, 
never complete. The continuous emergence of actual entities 
offers his new content . "Each novel actuality in the temporal 
world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in 
God. '.4 Whitehead attributes a more personal function to God 
in saying that he exercises "a tenderness which looses 
1. vlhitehead, Process • • • , p . 134. 
3 . ~· · p . 524 . 
2. Ibid. , p . 523 . 
4. Ibid. , p . 134. 
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no~hing that can be saved. "l It is clear from these two 
passages that God does not realize everything that occurs in 
his consequent nature . Whitehead further suggests that those 
elements which God does save retain their identity within the 
unity of God ' s experience . This is "the phase of perfected 
actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without 
the qualification of any l oss either of individual identity 
or of completeness of unity. "2 Actualized values may become 
immortal in God ' s nature as well as for subsequent world 
process . 
(2) Superjective nature . In spite of the permanency 
that God contributes to the universe he is still an actual 
entity. He is , in his consequent nature~ an acting subject. 
His primordial nature offers conceptual data to the world . 
It is an object for an acting occasion' s conceptual pre-
hension ' s . But an actual entity is both subject- superject. 
Whitehead provides for this aspect in God ' s superjective 
nature . Once again , however , God is different from ordinary 
entities . The concrete experience of God's consequent nature 
is available to concrescing entities by means of their 
physical prehensions of him without the "death" of God having 
1. Whitehead, Process • • • , p . 525. 2 . Ibid. , p. 532 . 
-
t o occur. God is actual, he is an entity but he is not an 
epochal occasion. He does not perish. 
Whitehead discusses God ' s superjective nature only 
briefly. His definition of it is that "the 'superjective' 
nature of God is the charac ter of the pragmatic value of his 
specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity 
in the various temporal instances."1 This nature is God's 
mode of effectiveness in the world. 
It would be both simple and erroneous to suppose that 
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because Whitehead's God has three natures he is to be equated 
with the Christian Trinity. Whitehead says of God, 
He is the binding element in the world • • • 
His purpose in the world is quality of attain-
ment . His purpose is always embodied in the 
particular ideals relevant to the actual state 
of the world. Thus all attainment is immortal 
in that it fashions the actual idea ls which are 
God in the world as it is now • • • He is not 
the world, but the valuation of the world. 2 
These few general statements about God indicate the uniqueness 
of his function . 
2 . The Values of Civilization 
Civilization requires education. One of Whitehead's 
1 . Whitehead, Process • • • , p. 135. 
2. Whitehead, Religion • • • , p. 527. 
Primary interests is the role education can play in enabling 
man to achieve a civilized life . Realized values of the 
past can be taught. Anticipated ideal aims of the future 
can be held up. The coalescence of past and future in 
present activity results in heightened vivid experience. 
The educated man recognizes the difference between what is 
great and what is trivial. All phases of his experience 
exhibit as dominant qualities truth, beauty, adventure, art, 
and peace. 
These are the particular values Whitehead proposes as 
supreme. For man, they are standards. It is evident that 
there cannot be value without antecedent 
standards of v alue , to discriminate the 
acceptance or rejection of what is before 
the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there 
is an antecedent limitation among values, 
introducing contraries, grades , and 
oppositions.l 
Appearance and Reality are two rea lms of experience for 
man. The values of civilization to be discussed are founded 
in the relation of Reality to Appearance . Whitehead, in 
referring to higher phases of experience says, "The contrast 
Appearance and Reality dominates those factors of experience 
which are discriminated in consciousness with peculiar 
1. l{hitehead , Science • • • , p . 256 
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distinctness. ul vJhitehead ' s meaning for the term Reality 
should by now be clear. He says that 
'" Appearance' is the effect of the activity 
of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and 
coordinations of the given physica l world under-
go transformation. It results from the fusion 
of the ideal with the actual:--The light that 
never was, on sea or land.2 
Reality is, however, not to be equated with the physical 
world. 
i. Truth 
Two possible sources of error wer e outlined in the dis-
cussion of symbolic reference and judgment. Error in either 
mode of activity is not evident to the subject committing it. 
If the image of a chair seen in a mirror is taken to be an 
actual chair through symbolic reference one is not aware of 
his error unless he attempts later to act towards the image 
as he would towards a chair. The prehensive act felt as a 
judgment is criticized only by later experience. In either 
mode the experient subject makes the decision expecting it 
is valid. The actual validity of a decision depends upon 
the actual circumstances surrounding the experient subject. 
To say with Dewey, "The hypothesis that works is a true one," 
is to misconstrue Whitehead ' s notion of truth. An hypothesis 
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rightly judged false may yet work when tested if circumstances 
1. ~itehead, Adventures ••• , p. 268. 2. Ibid., p. 270. 
have changed in the meanwhile. The validity of the propo-
sition for the original judging subject is not altered by 
subsequent criticism. More specifically, "Truth is a 
qualification which applies to Appearance alone. Reality 
is just itself, and it is nonsense to ask whether it be 
true or false."1 If Appearance does, in fact, conform to 
Reality there is truth. 
Whitehead also defines truth in more technical terms. 
He says that 
there is a truth-relation when two composite 
facts participate in the same pattern. Then 
knowledge about one of the facts involves 
knowledge about the other, so far as the truth-
relation extends.2 
Truth-relations are to be found in species more subtle than 
the literal-minded might suppose. Whitehead points out that 
the conformation of feelings in the appearance a baby exper-
iences informing him of his mother's cheerfulness is a 
truth-relation. Another type of truth-relation, vague and 
indirect, is termed "symbolic truth." For example, "Music, 
ceremonial clothing, ceremonial smells, and ceremonial 
rhythmic visual appearances, also have symbolic truth, or 
symbolic falsehood."3 Whitehead concludes, however, that 
1. Ibid., p. 309. 2. Ibid., p. 310 
3. Ibid., p. 319. 
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o1 
in the final analysis 
it is the blunt truth that we want. The final 
contentment of our aims requires something more 
than vulgar substitutes, or the subtle evasions, 
however delicate. The indirections of truth 
can never satisfy us . • • Apart from blunt 
truth, our lives sink decadently amid the perfume 
of hints and suggestions.! 
We are reminded of the educat or's task to expose the pupils 
directly to facts. The learned world, Whitehead accuses, is 
mediocre because it substitutes second-handedness for direct 
experience of blunt truth. 
ii. Beauty 
Where there is no activity there is no beauty. Beauty 
is a characteristic of the activity of subjects. Whitehead 
defines beauty as "the internal conformation of the various 
items of experience with each other, for the production of 
maximum effectiveness."2 It is inaccurate according to the 
organic philosophy to speak of a thing as having beauty. 
The objective contents of experience may be beautiful but 
beauty belongs to experience. To say that something is 
beautiful means that it has "the inherent capability for 
the promotion of Beauty when functioning as a datum in a 
percipient occasion."3 
1. Ibid., p. 321. 
3. Ibid., p. 329. 
2. Ibid., p. 341. 
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Justification of existence is found in beauty, realized 
by an actual occasion, fulfilling the teleology of the universe 
"directed to the production of Beauty."1 Appearance justifies 
itself to the immediate occasion in proportion to beauty and 
truth. Appearance that lacks a truth-relation to reality 
minimizes production of beauty. It is also observed that 
"truth matters because of beauty. 112 Whitehead, in admitting 
that there are subtle truth-relations, does not demand that 
appearance be a blunt representation of reality to promote 
beauty. Nor should the harmonious arrangement of factors 
be devoid of contrast. The promotion of the highest form of 
beauty demands a truth-relation and a patterned contrast of 
the elements of experience. 
Art, Whitehead notes, is important to the civilized life 
because it can convey subtle truths, it may, although it 
need not necessarily, be beautiful, but above all it evokes 
"into consciousness the finite perfections which lie ready 
for human achievement. 113 It can concretize for us indefinable 
truths, fleeting beautiful experiences we are hardly aware of, 
1. Ibid., p. 341. 
3. Ibid., p. 348. 
2. Ibid., p. 344. 
and generalities that escape us . It can, on the other hand, 
also draw our attention to the interconnections between 
familiar things we have been taking for granted abstracting 
the general from the particul ar . 
iii. Adventure 
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Any little boy knows that adventure is a value . Philoso-
phers of education are inclined to overlook adventure in 
their normative goals . Whitehead does not . Civilizations 
can rise or fall in proportion to the amount of adventure 
they fos ter. The search for new perfections, spontaneity, 
fresh approaches are all characteristics of a vital, evolving 
society. l1an ' s creative imagination expresses itself as 
adventure . He dons frog fins and oxygen tanks to plumb the 
depths of the oceans, he claws his was to the highest peaks 
breathing again from tanks . These are physical forms of 
adventure. They are culminations of the adventures of the 
mind that first conceived the possibilities . 
Deeds of daring are not primarily the adventures 
Whitehead believes typify a strong civilization. The great 
Greek dramatists and philosophers were adventurers, too. 
They looked forward into the unknown, using the past in 
reaching new creative insights but never facing backwards. 
There is always danger, often disavter, in drawing away from 
I o 
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the security of the known. There is always loss in adventure. 
The price i s at least rejection of the old and dear for 
what is new and fresh. The old perfection can be dangerous, 
too, though. To maintain any state, of perfection or of evil, 
entails repetition leading to lethargy and eventual fatigue 
and loss. Standing still may have a dearer price than the 
toil adventure claims. New problems arise as novelty is intro-
duced, as relationships change. These cannot always be dealt 
with in the old ways without disaster. 
Whitehead does not value change for its own sake nor 
does he hold that reje~tion of the past will enrichen our 
lives. His position is that 
when man ceases t o wander , he will cease to 
ascend in the scale of being. Physical 
wandering is still important, but greater 
still is the power of man's spiritual 
adventures--adventures of thought, adventures 
of passionate feeling, adventures of 
aesthetic experience.l 
Contemporary American educators who emphasize pupil "adjustment" 
mi ght well heed Whitehead's warning. Not only is there a move 
to "adjust" spiritual adventure out of young people's lives, 
there is also a noticable trend to soften the passion of 
children's feelings. Elementary schools and children's 
television programs seem linked in a conspiracy to show the 
1. Whitehead, Science ••• , P• 298. 
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world off as a place of soft little pussy cats and happy 
clapping children. A depthless world hardly worth the 
trouble of getting out of bed to see is unrolled. Educators 
wonder why motivation to learn, starting at a h i gh pitch in 
nursery school, is nearly gone in many cases by the fourth 
grade. The flavor of adventure is one element that has, too 
often, been removed. Without it, the stage of romance 
cannot flourish and the subsequent stages of learning suffer. 
iv. Peace 
Feelings can be rejected by anesthesia. Peace, for 
Whitehead, is not as Eastern thought would have it attained 
through anesthesia. Peace is an affirmation, a positive 
feeling. "It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence 
of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet 
momentous in its coordination of values."1 A deliberate 
aim at peace fails, usually ending in anesthesia. Peace is 
a gift beyond the control of purpose. It is as hard to 
define it as it is to achieve it. In a chapter Hhitehead 
entitles "Peace" he suggests much that it is: 2 "Removal of 
inhibition," a "purification of the emotions," it faces 
tragedy with both "understanding" and "preservation," it is 
"intuition of permanence," it is "trust in the efficacy of 
Beauty," and it "arises from aim beyond personality." One 
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might almost conclude that Whitehead is describing what it 
means to loose your life in order to find it. 
The peace-filled man is a lover of humanity. Parental 
love, so often a concern to educators when it is misdirected, 
is, in most cases, not the "self-sacrifice" of a peace-filled 
man. It is usually an expression of narrow selfishness. 
Pleasure is derived from doing things for the child because 
the parent identifies himself with the child. Married love 
is, Whitehead also sadly observes, usually equally selfish. 
The peace-filled person would be the ideal parent; he would 
also answer psychology's description of the mature person. 
v. Goodness 
Although Whitehead says that the ·~orld of Value con-
I tains within itself Evil as well as Good," and although he 
insists that God is limited by his goodness there is little 
reference made to "goodness" as a value of civilization. The 
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reason for this lies in what \-1hitehead means by good and evil. 
He defines evil as: 
A destructive agent among things greater than 
itself. In the summation of the more complete 
fact it has secured a descent towards nothing-
ness, in contrast to the creativeness of what 
can without qualification be termed good. Evil 
is positive and destructive.2 
1. Whitehead, Essays • ' p. 88. 
2. Whitehead, Religion ••• , p. 502-503. 
The unstable character of evil is its own downfall in the 
long run. The man, whose finer sensibilities have atrophied, 
may be little different from a hog. A hog is not evil in 
itself nor is the man. During the degradation he experiences 
evil for himself in the comparison with what he might be and 
in the end he remains as an evil for others. When the des-
truction has been accomplished the evil is not for the finer 
man that was, he no longer exists, but the evil is in the 
effect upon the social environment. "There is evil when 
things are at cross purposes."1 
Good is a contrast to evil. Turbulent experience is 
evil while good, at its highest, is a "peace which passeth 
all understanding." There is triviality in stable goodness, 
a state of interior life likened to evil on a larger view, 
because although there is the self-preservation of goodness 
creativity is diminished. ·~at is good is positive and 
creative."2 Goodness, for Whitehead, is a term describing 
adjusted patterning of experience. "In itself a pattern is 
neither good nor bad,"3 but evil and good are adjustments of 
patterns of experience. There are three factors to be con-
sidered in judging goodness: "The infusion of pattern into 
1. Ibid, p. 503. 2. Ibid., p. 503. 
3. Whitehead, Essays ••• , p. 111. 
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natural occurrences, and the stability of such patterns, 
and the modification of such patterns, is the necessary 
condition for the realization of the Good. 111 Educators who 
seek to guide their students into "good experiences'' have to 
consider that adjustment of patterning requires the present 
for action, the past for stability, and the future as the 
lure for modification. 
3. The Hierarchy of Values 
Is there a supreme value, an absolute value, that 
education must consider above all others? The liberal-
conservative Whitehead has warned us, "Nothing too much," 
in our educational practices. Beauty without truth or 
truth without beauty are experiences of minor value. When 
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one value predominates there is always danger of submerging 
what might have been a greater value. Perhaps a cosmology 
with creativity as the ultimate metaphysical principle should 
consider adventure as the generic value. But there is both 
novelty in modification and order in stability to be accounted 
for in the Good. Goodness requires both the freedom of novel 
advance that the mental pole of subjective activity can con-
tribute to experience and the element of determinism 
l. Ibid., p. 109. 
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experience finds in the order of objective potentialities. 
Perfection is a balance between fluency and permanency, 
between novelty and order, between speculation and method. 
But even perfection itself must have its foil, adventure, or 
balance becomes static. 
The fluency of the relationship among values is evident 
but to be true to the scheme there must also be evident some 
order among them. The values bear a hierarchial relationship 
to one another. Whitehead's ladder of values is delicate, 
however, for a particular value in realization might be so 
emphasized as to change its position on the scale. Keeping 
this in mind, a gradation can be outlined starting at one 
end with the mal-adjustment of patterning that is positive 
and evil then swinging over through the neutrality of tri-
viality to the various adjustments of patterning, again 
positive, but now creative and good. Education, although it 
should recognize the positive aspect of evil, is primarily 
concerned with promoting the positive experiences that are 
good. 
The educated man is recognized by his exemplification 
of the values of civilization. He cannot pursue Peace in 
itself without loosing it. Still, he will be a peace-filled 
man. His conscious pursuit of lesser values will have 
graced him with peace. His aim at wisdom keeps moving him 
towards peace. He feels justification for the Appearances 
he experiences for they exemplify beauty and bear a truth-
relation to Reality. If he must sacrifice either, he finds 
the truth-relation has less to recommend it in isolation 
than has the realization of Beauty. Yet minor beauty, 
bordering as it does upon the neutrality of triviality, is 
sacrificed for blunt truth. Both beauty and truth are pur-
sued in the spirit of adventure. The educated man finds 
beauty and truth because his spirit is venturesome fearing 
neither freshness of thought, passionate feelings, nor 
novel aesthetic experience. His imagination draws him into 
the future while his knowledge of the past guides his 
wanderings. 
Beauty is the teleology of the universe but for a man 
Peace is the crowning value that he can hope to achieve. 
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Peace is, therefore, at the peak of the hierarchy. Adventure, 
the spirit of evolutive progress, must place next. The 
higher forms of Beauty and the blunt Truth follow. Art, both 
its practice and its appreciation, is next. Finally, in 
minor beauty and indirect truths we approach the neutral point 
of triviality. In any case there is always for the philosophy 
7 
of organism the generic value that all entities experience 
in merely being actual. For the bare enjoyment of 
experiencing is a value. 
God is best served by the peace-filled man who, White-
head says, "is extending the influence of the source of all 
order."1 Peace is a gift but even a gift may be earned. 
The learning experiences that give scope to and encourage 
adventure also encourage Romance. The education that fosters 
beauty recognizes the stage of discipline as a setting in 
order of whatever experience offers, for producing maximum 
effectiveness. Ideas are proven to be of wider worth because 
of the truth-relation they bear to reality. "Prove all 
things; hold fast to that which is good." Indeed, for White-
head, "the essence of education is that it be religious."2 
4. Sunnnary 
One source of values is the intermediate phases of 
experience. The evaluative activity of subjects actualizes 
the potentialities that the subjective aim allows as worth 
accepting into feeling. In man, reason is the chief eval-
uative tool. The speculative reason, seeking sheer under-
standing, is disciplined by method. The two aspects of 
1. Whitehead, Adventures ••• , p. 377. 
2. Whitehead, Aims ••• , p. 26. 
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reason complement one another to promote the better life. 
Morality, another source of value, is a mode of controlling 
process in order to maximize importance. It is generality 
of outlook in which concern for the future in light of the 
general good controls present behaviour. Ideal aims deter-
mine what is important in the moral act. God is the 
actuality in whose primordial nature the eternal objects 
subsist eternally in patterned, contrasting relationships 
for realization by temporal actualities. The aim to act is 
a conceptual prehension of the pervasive eternal object 
creativity. Thus God is the principle of order and of 
novelty. The world adds to his consequent nature in its 
effect upon him. In return his superjective nature is a 
datum for temporal entities. 
The values of civilization can, with a cautionary note, 
be listed in a descending hierarchy: First Peace, then 
Adventure, Beauty, Truth, Art, and finally, the minor 
beauties and indirect truths. But each require the other in 
some measure to heighten the vividness of experience. All 
the values are positive and good for they are, in proper 
proportion to each other, creative. Evil, also positive, is 
destructive. 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATIONS OF THE PROCESS 
It is vain to theorize about educational objectives 
and procedures if practical applications cannot be made 
of the theories . There has been no large scale movement 
in educational circles to study or apply Whitehead's 
theories . Many current text books dealing with curricu-
lum development refer to Whitehead ' s Aims of Education 
although primarily as a bibliographical reference . 1 
Educational philosophers are aware of Whitehead's concern 
with their specialty although several eastern professors 
of this subject indicate less interest in or knowledge of 
the cosmological framework than of the educational recom-
mendations . 2 
Whitehead's essays dealing directly with problems of 
education are certainly a source of inspiration to both 
teachers and edministrators. It is far less certain that 
1. See Harold Alberty, Reorganizing the High School Cur-
riculum (New York: The Macmiltaii"""'Co'iiiPaily, 1953);-ind 
B.O. Smith, William 0 . Stanley, and J. Harlan Shore, 
Fundamentals of Curriculum Development (New York: 
World Book Company, 1950) . 
2. Philosophy of education professors from Tufts, Boston 
University, Framingham State Teachers, & Bridg~water 
College were asked if they had ever made a concentrated 
study of Whitehead ' s metaphysic. None had done so. 
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the mild tone of reform they express has had a profound 
effect in curriculum development. He seems never to have 
doubted that the subject centered curriculum will be the 
skeleton of the whole process . There is no criticism 
made of the so called Activity Curriculum or The Core 
Curriculum. Either whitehead was not aware of these 
experimental approaches or his interest in criticizing 
specific practices had waned by the time the experiments 
were being made. In any case, his philosophy of education 
is not revolutionary in respect to the systematization of 
the learning process. 
Possibly the most profound difference Whitehead ' s 
work will have upon education today is in reforming the 
teacher's role from that of an employee of some institution 
to tha t of a practicing artist. 1 There can be n o formula 
to express the rhythm of the learning process. Teachers 
must develop a sense of proportion in guiding the student 
from the stages of romance to precision to generalization . 
1. See Gilbert Highet's The Art of Teaching (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1958)-.--ATtfiough Highet nowhere refers 
to Whitehead his emphasis upon the responsibility 
teachers wield in the life of the child and ultimately 
in the progress of civilization complements White-
head's conception of the role. The introduction of 
the term "artist" is particularly appropriate in 
this discussion. 
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This calls for the tender touch of artistry . Likewise, 
relating a specific subject, Latin, science or any other 
to the one subject Life is not the task of a plodding 
wage-slave. Imaginative insight is demanded. 
Formal education begins at a younger age now than it 
did when Whitehead was writing. Nursery schools require 
particularly sensitive artistry from their teachers. 
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There is little discussion in Whitehead's works about 
educating younger children yet his general precepts are 
applicable. He would place the main emphasis upon romance. 
Nursery school children have just passed through a great 
stage of precision in learning to walk and to talk. Although 
the learning was not formalized it nevertheless required 
discipline from the child. The first stage of generalization 
arrived for the child in most cases before he entered nursery 
school. Building upon this stage, using it as the initial 
stage of romance in a further cycle, the sensitive teacher 
guides the child's discoveries of the wonderful world of 
other children with whom he can communicate wtth his new 
freedom of speech. The world of nature is introduced. 
The snow that filled a glass at the beginning of the 
morning is by noon less than half a glassful of water. 
His questions sometimes demand an answer from the realm of 
precision but the teacher will not force too man~ of the 
specific reasons upon him. Instead, he will be inspired 
to wonder more. His technical education is not neglected. 
He will pound with his little hammer, in and out, in and 
out. No one is concerned that his efforts do not produce 
a house. He is learning to use tools. He is becoming 
more civilized. 
1. Secondary School Curriculum 
\<Jhen the child has become a teenager and steps into a 
high school he should find the same three areas of learning: 
The literary, the scientific, and the technical offered to 
him with a special emphasis upon one of them suitable to 
his particular skills and interests. He will seldom be 
this fortunate. Nursery schools, whether aware that a man 
named Whitehead lived or not are more often than not ful-
filling the tasks he would have set for them. Secondary 
schools still suffer greviously from failing to ask the 
question Why do children want to attend nursery schools 
and then, later, so often hate to attend high schools? 
The formula to determine levels of achievement takes cogni-
zance of motivation but educators are more apt to argue the 
merits of particular awards and punishments than to ask 
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Where along the way and how did ~ kill the eagerness to 
learn?1 The specific date of death may not be determin-
able but a discussion of what kinds of learning experi-
ences the high school might offer students will show that 
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the search should not be for new gimmicks, prizes, penalties 
or even new curricula. It must be a search for a mode of 
presentation of a subject curriculum that balances experi-
ences between the three main divisions, literary, 
scientific, technical while relating the facts of each 
discipline to the lives of the students. Whitehead remarks 
that 
we are becoming aware that in adjusting a 
curriculum, it is not sufficient that some 
specified subject should be taught. We 
have to ask many questions and to make 
many experiments before we can determine 
its best relation to the whole body of 
educational influences which are to mould 
the pupil.2 
Whitehead asks educators to remember process is existence, 
process is patterned. The pattern is rhythmic, can be 
discerned and must not be overlooked by those who determine 
the curriculum. 
1. Cf. Harry S. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc~, 1954). Broudy rejects 
a subject-centered curriculum for several reasons. One 
criticism of it is that it fails to arouse motivation. 
Unlike Whitehead, Broudy sees the very mode of system-
atization of material as the reason for weak motivation 
of so many students. 
2. Whitehead, Essays ••• , p. 189. 
A parent complains about a low grade in a science 
course because the teacher will not accept the student's 
poor grammar, atrocious spelling and illegible handwriting. 
But, the parent contends, the boy knows his "science". 
This is not an English course. The administration agrees 
with the parent. The teacher must raise the grade or 
face the consequences. This is one actual instance of 
citizen and administration attempting to "divide the seam-
less coat of learning. 111 It is not an uncommon occurrence. 
When Whitehead divides the curriculum into the literary, 
the scientific, and the technical he expects a fusion of 
the three categories to be in effect rather than a pigeon-
holing of subjects. 
Perhaps Whitehead concerns himself less with primary 
school education because it is difficult for one teacher 
presenting all the subjects to fragment learning. In the 
first six grades a teacher is equally critical of spelling 
whether the lesson be geography, history or arithmetic. 
Later, specialists are required to satisfy the student's 
need to learn in depth. Then a teacher often feels his 
speciality is his only concern. Let some other teacher 
correct faulty grammar. 
1. Whitehead, Aims ••• , p. 23. 
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Another practice of primary educators absolves them 
somewhat from Whitehead's critical attention. They 
recognize the need to involve children's bodies as well as 
their minds in the learning process. Hhitehead proposes 
a moral for education: 
A training in handicraft of all types should 
form a large element in every curriculum. 
Education is not merely an appeal to the 
abstract intelligence. Purposeful activity, 
intellectual activity, and the immediate 
sense of worth-while achievement, should be 
conjoined in a unity of experience.! 
What happens to purposeful activity if a science classroom, 
for example, contains only enough space for thirty-five 
chairs tha t thirty-five students occupy for forty-five 
minutes? This is not to equate experiments with handicraft 
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but to criticize the many secondary schools where "activity" 
is reserved for the baseball diamond because the teacher 
willing or not, there is not space available for activities 
of any sort. 
Secondary schools might satisfy many of Whitehead's 
proposals for them with a cur riculum. If teachers could be 
found who could instruct one group of students in a ll the 
high school subjects as is done during primary years 
division of subject matter could be avoided, activities 
1. Ibid., p. 164. 
could be correlated to intellectual experiences, the day's 
schedule would not be chopped into artificial little 
periods punctuated by prompt ly ringing bells. Whitehead 
does not make this suggestion. A man who has worked with 
many teachers, he recognizes human limita tions. The 
answer is still to be found in assigning experts to teach 
specific subjects, with the difference that they be trained 
to be artists whose raw material is the whole student, a 
growing , vibrant, thinking and acting entity. 
i. Literary Education 
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This general category includes language, the classics 
and art . "The educational method of the literary curriculum 
is the study of language."1 History, literature, grammar, 
living foreign languages, the social sciences and several 
other courses may be lumped under the heading Language for 
they have a common dependence upon language skills. The 
classics, although they involve language, will be seen to 
fulfill a somewhat different purpose. Art plays both its 
own role and a part in the other literary subdivisions. 
1. Whitehead, Aims ••• , p. 58. 
I ;.. I 
(1) Language. When both complex and subtle communi-
cation is possible between individuals and groups within a 
society a high level of culture is possible. Communication 
involves more than a vocabulary. Words in themselves, 
Whitehead insists, do not fully express ideas or feelings. 1 
There cannot be a language that will be a universal mode 
of expressing all of man's ideas. Nevertheless, the 
language of one's o~vn culture must be mastered as fully 
as possible to permit maximum communication in this mode. 
Whitehead believes that the ages from tv1elve to fifteen 
11 should be dominated by a mass attack upon language, so 
planned tha t a definite result in itself worth having, is 
thereby achieved. 112 The Junior Hi gh years or the seventh, 
eighth and ninth grades would be the period of this con-
centrated study. 
To attain proficiency in language literature must be 
used as study material. The past, so important to the 
present, is brought alive for us through literature. To 
rely entirely upon this source however, is to overlook 
the fact that 11defective insights of the earlier period 
have been rooted in l anguage and literature. Also language 
1. Whitehead, Process ••• , p. 403. 
2 . Whitehead, Aims ••• , p . 34. 
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dictates our unconscious presuppositions of thought."1 On 
the other hand, the best thoughts and imagination in the 
realm of values are brought into the present through 
literature. Records of historical events are available. 
Philosophical criticism and speculation are introduced. 
If through the artistry of the teacher there is an awakening 
of appreciation of literature and history that is both 
intellectual and emotional the study material plays an 
effective part in the life of the student. 
A blow by blow analysis of literary works is often 
attempted by high-school English teachers. Each year the 
sophomore class in a Ne'l.v England town devotes four weeks 
to
11The Lady of the Lake'' insuring almost universal detest-
a tion of the poem and, by extension, of a ll poetry. white-
head maintains that 
mere literary knmvledge is of slight import-
ance. The only t hing s tha t matter is, how 
it is known. The facts related are nothing. 
Literature only exists to express and 
develop that imaginative world which is our 
life, the kingdom which is within us. 2 
Pace and scale are prime considerations in teaching any 
subject. It is impera tive in using literature as study 
1. Whitehead, Modes ••• , p. 90. 
2. Whitehead, Aims •.• , p . 66. 
material to time the reading, the discussion of the ideas 
presented and their application to t he present so that the 
student will see "the wood by means of the trees" but 
neither the wood nor the trees in isolation. Probably 
Whitehead does not expect all students in every class to 
be reached but he does insist on the major point; litera-
ture is to be enjoyed.l It is the teacher's task to help 
each student to enjoy it. 
As a further aid to mastery of language v!hitehead 
suggests French be studied. Occasionally there are reasons 
forwarded for studying that smack of snobbery. Whitehead 
does not suggest it will facilitate travel, ease one's 
intercourse with the "international set" or even improve 
foreign relations directly. Instead he proposes this 
particular language because it is closer to English in 
construction and vocabulary than other languages. He 
maintains English grammar is grasped indirectly through 
the study of French constructions. Its logic is more 
evident as a contrast to French. Furthermore, only by 
acquaintance with the native literature songs and folkways 
of a foreign people can one come to understand their ideas 
in relation to their way of life. Understanding of other 
1. ~., p . 66 . 
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societies is a prerequisite for the cultured man, the 
educated man. The current proposal to introduce Russian 
into the secondary school curriculum would meet with 
Whitehead's approval only on this basis. The argument 
that we must speak their language as a national defense 
measure is too opportunist for Whitehead. Remembering 
his dictum to limit the number of subjects taught it is 
probable French would be the only living language in 
Whitehead's curriculum even today. 
During this period of "mass attack" on language 
history plays a subordinate role. English, French, and 
Latin literature provide much European historical data. 1 
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If history is taught per se at this time it must be pre-
sented in the romantic spirit. To expect memorization of 
lists of kings, dates of wars or any other mass of specific 
facts is to pace the curriculum so as to discourage the 
students. At this point there is little possible appli-
cation of such facts. They will soon be forgotten. The 
treatment of history that will be efficacious will "not 
start with generalized statements, but with concrete 
examples exhibiting the slow succession of period to 
period, and of mode of life to mode of life, and of race 
1. ~., P• 35 . 
I -)1 
131 
to race."1 Works of art, models, museum exhibits of 
previous epochs will enliven the learning. Much of what 
is now included under the label Social Science could be 
included in these courses. 
(2) Classics. Winnie the Pooh in Latin, a recent 
valedictorian address in Latin, President Kennedy's reply 
in Latin to some fans all show a resurgent interest in 
the study of classics. At one time Latin was a required 
high school course primarily because it was believed to be 
a sign of the educated man, it was necessary to understand 
scientific terminology, and it should aid in enriching 
one's English vocabulary. Whitehead proposes some different 
reasons. The majority of students can profit from the study 
of Greek and Latin classics because at secondary school 
level the student is best able to approach knowledge in 
terms of the particular. The study of the structure of 
Latin trains a student in exact, logical thought. As 
with the indirect effect of the study of French under-
standing the structure of an unfamiliar language facilitates 
understanding of the logic of one's own language. Familiar-
ity with English is acquired early in life; to analyze it in 
high school, to pick it apart minutely is to court boredom. 
1. Hhitehead, Aims • . . , p. 82. 2. I bid ., p . 71 . 
Not so with a new language . Grammatical usages can even 
reveal the philosophical and political attitudes of an 
era. Whether an emperor refers to himself as "we" or "I" 
signifies his concept of his role as an embodiment of the 
soul of a nation or as an individual who has the power to 
rule. The subleties may not be grasped explicitly but 
they, nevertheless, affect the student's understanding of 
the past. 
Roman literature, Whitehead confesses, is inferior 
to English literature.1 That the study material of Latin 
is Roman literature lack ing in subleties, depth, richness, 
praising Rome uncritically is not a drawback to its use. 
There is much to be learned from it beyond battle dates 
and campaign details. European geography and history are 
both revealed. Rome was the cradle of modern European 
society; its rule by law is still a basis of our social 
structure. The literature of Rome tells us much about 
other races. Further, the greater value of the litera-
ture is the view it gives of a people of massive virtues 
and massive vices, of things done on a "grand scale." 
Education should impart the "vision of greatness." Rome 
g ives this precious gift to our world . 
Translations of classica l litera ture, abhorred 
1. Ibid., p . 75 . 
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though they may be by purists, are useful , in fact , re-
quired for the balanced presentation of the material. 
Recognizing most student's limitations, Whitehead suggests 
translations of Greek and Latin literature can be used to 
fulfill the minimum requi rement for secondary school 
education.1 In addition, before the tedious picking away 
at translating that causes the average student to loose 
all sight of the material as a work of art begins a 
"scholar ' s translation" should be read . Loss of insight 
into the work is avoided. Acquaintance with the original 
language v1ill be more effective . Both the original and 
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the translation are to be used. In no case must the second-
handedness of digests be substituted. 
(3) Art. Communication , often considered to consist 
only of language exchanges, does not, in fact, begin nor 
end with words nor their obvious substitutes. Works of 
art also communicate~ As philosophy itself must go beyond 
the realm of prose into the vagueness of the realm of 
poetry so, too, human communication takes place through 
art, vaguer than words but sometimes more profound. The 
value of beauty to human life was seen to stand near the 
peak of the scale, at times to be the peak. Whitehead ' s 
1. Ibid., p. 78. 2 . Ibid., p . 80 . 
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concept of what a well educated man is dictates that schools 
place a higher premium on art in the curriculum than is 
usually n~v given it. The elective or even the required 
course "Art" is seldom a subject important to students. It 
is often the period or two during the week when one can 
"goof off" a bit. Human experience is enriched by 
heightening the values. Works of art reveal beauty, exhibit-
ing how great the excellence of human life can be, to what 
heights of achievement man can rise. Nature's beauty has 
its offering as well. 
At present, the organic interrelation between art as a 
subject and other areas of the curriculum has been neg lected. 
Languages, literature, history need the subtle communication 
of works of art to come alive to the student. The student, 
in turn, needs to express certain insights, difficult to 
verbalize, in art forms. Assignments in poetry composition 
are not enough. Graphic arts can and should be coordinated 
with the literary high school subjects. ~.J'hitehead' s require-
ment to express thought in activity demands a wider use of 
l 
art as expression of experience. 
ii. Scientific Education 
Literary education is a continuing proce s s from childhood 
1. Whitehead , Essays • • • , p . 164 . 
until death but the concentration upon l anguage of the 
early secondary years will swing into the stage of general-
ization for fifteen year olds. Science has been presented 
in its romantic phase until now . The time is ripe for the 
sciences to swing into the stage of precision. Whitehead 
proposes that 
a year's work on science coming on top of 
the previous romantic study, should make 
everyone understand the main princip les 
which gover n the development of mechanics, 
physics, chemistry, algebra and geometry. 
Understand tha t they are not beginning 
these subjects, but they are putting to-
gether a previous discursive study by an 
exact formulation of their main ideas.l 
It seems highly unlikely , in sp ite of the logic of ~.Jhite-
head ' s argument, that current practices will be revised to 
devote the sophomore year to the science s. Most science 
courses are planned on the predica tion that the student 
starts with simple principles and a few facts moving to the 
more comp lex. That the complexity or difficulty of the 
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task s hould not determine its priority i s one of ~hitehead ' s 
most important dicta to curriculum planners. 
(1) Natura l science. w~itehead describes the scientific 
education in genera l: It "is primarily a training in the 
a rt of observing na tura l phenomena , and in the knowledge 
1. whitehead, Aims . . • . • , p . 36. 
and deduction of laws concerning the sequence of such 
phenomena."1 There are myriad phenomena to observe. Each 
type tha t has been labelled a science requires its own mode 
of observation, its own type of thought to deduce its laws. 
Time limitations dictate that selections be made for the 
curriculum. Science, as a whole, cannot be a subject for 
secondary schools. A student's interests might determine 
which branch of science he will study. If his future 
occupation has been chosen his selection has an aim. As 
Whitehead suggests, "It is possible to find scientific 
courses which illumine most occupations. ,2, The courses are 
not , however, to be taught as a vocational preparation. 
Probably, in any case, no more than two sciences can be 
studied efficiently during the period of concentration. 
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In the general education the early secondary schooling 
includes "descriptive summaries of physiological, botanical, 
physical, chemical, astronomical, and geological facts ."3 
Whitehead suggests the two concentrated science courses 
might -.;,1ell be physics and chemistry. This is the "hard 
core" of scientific work. At the same time natural 
1. Ibid., p. 59. 
2. r.;hitehead, Ibid., p. 66. 
3 . Whitehead, Essays . . . , p. 195. 
science should have its "soft core" element -- i.e., no 
laboratory, browsing, self-initiated studies in possibly 
botany or astronomy. Laboratory work should give way 
toward the end of the secondary schooling to lecture 
courses. How the applications of science affect our socia~ 
industrial, and politica l lives should be covered. 
(2) Mathematics. Whitehead protes ts the fatality of 
reconditeness in mathematics courses. He suggests it can 
be avoided if the examples, as many as need be, are "direct 
illustrations of the main ideas. 11 1 The great value of the 
study is that because it develops a student ' s power for 
abstract thinking it can free the mind from the grip of 
particularities. One must therefore, avoid in any mathe-
matics course a "pointless accumula tion of details . " 2 On 
the other hand, Whitehead ' s fine sense of balance appears 
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as he further cautions that a course must apply generalities 
to particular facts for their verification. 
Although Whitehead was for many years a mathematics 
teacher he makes it clear that the subject is no more 
important than others even though everything has a qualitative 
aspect. The curriculum has to limit all subjects by some 
1. Whitehead, Aims • • • , p. 87. 2. Ibid., p. 8~ 
criterion. Mathematics will stress relations; relations 
of numbers, space, and quantities. 
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Geometry is particularly valuable to develop logical 
thought habits. Whitehead recommends concentration on 
similarity, congruence, and trigonometry. He hopes 
periodicy will be studied. He would like to see secondary 
schools offer analytic geometry and, if possible, projective 
geometry. 
More detailed specification of course content is suggested 
for the mathematical curriculum than vlhitehead offers for the 
other disciplines. The details are less important than his 
stress upon relating mathematics to the facts of other 
curricular subjects. Graphs, expressing f undamental a l gebraic 
principles, can reveal relations between the phenomena of 
history and of social fact~s which might otherwise remain 
hidden. In increasing mathematical knowledge the t eacher 
will deepen the pupil's understanding of the social forces 
which affect his own life. 
iii. Technical Education 
Trade schools too often are a dumping ground for unruly, 
dull witted, or unmotivated students. \~hitehead conceives 
of the technical education in a more positive light. The 
industria lization of our culture demands a large core of 
t /.( 
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highly skilled workers . "Factory hands" are not to be the 
product of technical education . Rather skilled craftsmen 
should result, men whose general education fits them to 
adapt to new techniques over and over again, whose education 
has shown them how to derive personal satisfaction from work 
because it is worthwhile and meaningful. The Benedictine 
ideal is the aim: ·~ork should be transfused with intellect-
ual and moral vision and thereby turned into a joy, triumph-
ing over its weariness and its pain. " 1 In essence, the 
techn ical education is to be a liberal education; "an 
d . f h h d f h . . . .. 2 e ucat1on or t oug t an or aest et1c apprec1at1on. 
Whitehead reverses this point insisting that the liberal 
education must also be technical. Whichever specialization 
a student selects he should complete high school knowing 
something well and being able to do something well . 
If the dominant emphasis is to be technical the currie-
ulum will include the natural sciences most applicable to 
the technical field of specialization; i.e. , biology for 
agriculture, geology for mining , etc. In mathematics 
geometry for carpenters would be appropriate, for example. 
The literature to be presented will stress aesthetic 
l . Ibid., p . 54 . 2. Ibid., p. 55. 
enjoyment. Historical -works should be chosen to illustrate 
social forces of work that affect the present life of the 
student. 
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Secondary schooling is often terminal education leaving 
seventeen year olds to face adulthood with ho more formal 
education . In the United States during the years from 
seventh to twelfth grade most schools devoted to general 
education scatter the attention of the students among bits 
and fragments of subjects, drama, organized sports, clubs , 
band, etc., until it is hardly poss ible to predict their 
graduates will be men and women "who possess both culture 
and expert knowledge in some special direction."1 we leave 
the production of such citizens to colleges and universities . 
2 . Universities 
The church once was the agency developing civilization. 
•lhitehead recognizes it has lost this function. Now, "the 
task of a university is the creation of the future, so 
far as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, 
can affect the issue."2 He refers to certa in types of 
universities where a general program is offered. Colleges 
devoted entirely to vocational training stressing 
1. Ibid., p. 55. 2 . Ibid . , p. 13. 
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applications rather than abstract knowledge have an unfort-
unate emphasis. The other extreme is also unfortunate. 
Whitehead's experiences in London lead him to observe that 
"the mass of mankind, including many of its most valuable 
leaders, requires something betwixt and between. Co1nmon 
sense and no abstract theory should dictate what any 
particular university attempts'.'! 
Secondary schooling has brought the student through a 
painful rise from particularities to a glimpse of general-
ities. Whitehead deplores the college tha t continues 
during the freshman year to present a rehash of the old 
wor k in the same spirit. The University should 
start from general ideas and study their 
applications to concrete cases • • • I do 
not mean that it should be abstract in the 
sense of divorce from concrete fact, but 
that concrete fact should be studied as 
illustrating the scope of general ideas.2 
Until the text-book is tucked away, the lecture notes lost, 
the little details memorized for quizzes forgotten learning 
is useless. This, not to be taken literally, means that 
the facts are not in themselves useless, but they are use-
less until generality of vision illuminates them. In other 
words , "the ideal of a University is not so much knowledge, 
1. ~lhitehead, Essays • 
2. v:hitehead , Aims •. . , 
, p. 164. 
p . 38 . 
14 1 
as power. Its business is to convert the knowledge of a 
boy into the power of a man. 111 
i. Imaginative Insight 
University professors are often depicted as wooly-
headed dreamers dwelling remote from the facts of ever y-
day life. The practical man of affairs is thought to 
lack imag ination and ideals. Whitehead finds it tragic 
that creative insight and practical experience are so 
seldom found together. He believes universities can pre-
sent the facts imaginatively, making their relevance to 
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hwnan problems explicit. If they cannot perform the function 
of awakening imaginative insight there is little use for 
them in this day of vast libraries wherein the factual 
knowledge is recorded. 
Imagination is not a thing to be acquired then kept 
forever. 11The learned and imaginative life is a way of 
living, and is not an article of commerce. "2 A way of 
living takes time to establish. The imaginative vision 
must mature in an atmosphere free of adult responsibility . 
The student should be allowed to think wrongly without 
peril to himself. If, for instance, when he studies 
1 . Ibid. , p . 39. 2 • Ibid • , p • 1 0 2 . 
Karl Marx a young man wants to advocate communism he should 
be free to do so. By imagining the possibilities the facts 
portend, by involving oneself in the clash of opposing 
doctrines supported by evidence one can eventually face 
the complexities of life equipped to cope with them with a 
vision of what might be. 
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Over verbalizing of ideals and values can be dangerous. 
Whitehead points out that "experience does not occur in 
the clothing of verbal phrases . It involves clashes of 
emotion and unspoken revelations of the nature of things. 111 
Knowing is characterized by revelation, meaning in this 
case, flashes of insight not God revealing self. ,Jhite-
head clarifies further, saying: "Revelation is the 
enlargement of clarity. It is not a deduction , though it 
may issue from a deduction."2 Universities, to foster 
imaginative insight must not rely on words entirely. 
They must offer opportunities for all kinds of adequate 
immediate experiences. \-Jords must not be mistaken for 
the concepts or the things they symbolize. 
ii. Staff 
A university professor once said, "There is nothing 
you can learn from a teacher, you cannot learn by yourself." 
1. :lhitehead, Essays • . . , p. 216 2. Ibid., p. 216 . 
He taught physiology and was himself an example of what 
you could learn from a teacher. His own text-book, it 
is true, contained all the facts his students needed. 
Had it been absorbed away from him a store of knowledge 
could have been gained but the effect upon students of 
his imagina tive insight, his vigour, his humility would 
have been lost. It is a tribute to what he conveyed above 
and beyond the facts that many years later students still 
pursuing his speciality have kept his text-book , long out-
of-date, full of facts no longer pertinent. "Efficient 
pedants and dullards "1 are not easy to s pot. Whitehead 
fears that only when the promise of youth has been 
stunted for a number of years will the public be able to 
tell the difference . The university demanding a high out-
put of scholarly works , papers, orig inal research from its 
faculty pressurizes the staff into producing what it has 
not the time to while being a source of inspiration to the 
students. Leisurely intercourse between students and 
faculty is to be fostered rather than discouraged . 
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Freedom from financial worries, from outside political 
pressures, freedom to think and act without irrational 
restraint should be as s ured for the faculty . The conditions 
1. Ibid., p. 104. 
which foster good teaching when the right man is available 
are as necessary to maintain as it is to discover the 
right men in the first place. 
iii. Administration 
The task of a university, to aid in the achieving of 
civilization, is in no way similar to the task of industry. 
The college "factory" is deplorable. Administrators must 
1 
set the tone. To check on faculty members - are they 
lecturing, are they with students - is not the appropriate 
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attitude. What should be determined is how well instructors 
are aiding students with their self-development, how much 
are they encourag ing the students. This kind of output is 
difficult to measure. Industries can check output. Workers 
can bargain for more pay. But the susp icious eyeing between 
labor and management in industry has no p lace in a University. 
As an agent for culture, each member of a university staff 
should be a cultured man whose word, whose honor, whose 
sense of justice puts human relations amongst staff members 
upon a high plane. All the members of a university 
community should be expressing a common devotion to the 
grea t values education imparts. 
iv. Business School 
The general precepts discussed so far could r e fer to 
any school within a University. \.., hitehead, in demanding 
1. :Jhitehead , .. . a1mS • • • , p . 101. 
I '1 ~,. 
style as an aim of education, calls for specialization. 
The business school is given as an example of one area of 
specialization at the university level. 
Generalities and facts are to be presented in the mode 
discussed earlier. Here, though, the specific applications 
will be in the field of industry and business. The man 
who is to be a success in the business world must be 
familiar with religion, his tory, politics, with many areas 
of knowledge . He needs the broadest possible base of 
information . He must develop an ability to draw out the 
general laws from a mass of facts. Some value scheme 
must be accepted as an organizing principle . The efficient 
man of balanced judgment requires also to be able to grasp 
the facts imag inatively. Whitehead approves Harvard ' s 
move in establishing a business school that can produce 
trained leaders for the field as it has done for other 
fields for centuries. 1 
3. Contemporary Applica tion 
Dewey ' s philosophy of education has been an admitted 
guide of many educators. Inquiries to find a school or an 
individual administrator avowedly ''Whiteheadian" have been 
almost fruitless. Incoming faculty members of Beaver 
1 . I bid., p . 105 . 
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Country Day School in Brookline , ~~ssachusetts are given 
a copy of Aims of Education to read . There is no follow-
up made . Shady Hill School in Cambridge, Massachusetts 
admits to a heavy leaning in favor of Whitehead ' s proposals. 
In none of its literature is \fuitehead mentioned. A visit 
to the school was undertaken. The nursery group pursued 
the activities usual to any well run nursery school . The 
classes in all grades are smaller than in public schools . 
An atmosphere of interest and busy attention to the work 
at hand character ized the students observed. There was 
a marked difference between the activities and the air of 
freedom in Shady Hill and many public schools . To one 
who attended an excellent private school herself Shady Hill 
seemed normal and not unusual. The fact that it is private, 
is selective (the IQ span is 120-160~ makes it no model 
for public schools with skimped budgets and a school popu-
lation ranging from the dull-witted to children of genius 
mentality. The shop teacher did offer that Hhitehead ' s 
precepts were overtly applied in the manual arts . The 
eighth grade general science t eacher was purposely pre-
senting the material throughout the year in the romantic 
mode. Throughout the period of observation nothing was 
noticed that violated any of Whitehead ' s proposals . How 
much direct influence Whitehead ' s works have had on Shady 
Hill ' s practices cannot be determined without a long - term 
study of the history of the school . No one was prepared 
to admit that his philosophy was or is the determining 
factor of the school ' 's curt:iculum. 
A controlled experiment to weigh the effect upon 
students of Whitehead ' s philosophy of education is beyond 
the scope of this thesis . A tria l ba»oon was , therefore, 
sent up to serve mer ely as an example . Re cently a fifteen 
session adult university extension course in introductory 
philosophy was t aught using rhythmic presenta tion of 
material. Only a few students had previous college experi-
ence. The particular a im was to infuse the students wit h 
enthusiasm for the study and reading of phi losophy. 
The criterion for choosing a text was the need for 
acquiring some material in depth. A book can be studied 
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in privacy and the slower students can linger over it a s 
needed. Agreeing with Whitehead tha t Plato ' s shadow is 
visible even today , and because Plato asks more questions 
than he answer~G . M.A. Grube's book Plato ' s Thought (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1958) was chosen. There is the danger here 
of second-handedness although Plato in trans lation is also 
second-hand. It was hoped that the more curious would read 
some dialogues without an assignment to do so. One half 
the class did. Another reason for the selection of this 
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text was its division of Plato's ideas into areas of thought. 
The course was to cover metaphysics, e pistemology, ethics, 
aesthetics, logic, and social philosophy touching only on 
the main ideas. Except for logic, the text divided Plato's 
ideas into these areas. Three assigned papers (the state 
requires t wo) emphasized reading. Each student could choose 
from a list according to his particular interests. The 
reports were in three parts: a summary, pertinent quotations, 
and critical comments. Three examinations (two required) 
punctuated the end of each two branches covered. The questions 
required the ability to think through problems but only the 
final test required any memorization. 
Each branch of philosophy considered was presented with 
a rhythmic cycle of its own. The entire course progressed 
gradually from a primarily romantic presentation to a 
final session devoted to broad generalizations. The mode of 
presentation of aesthetics will suffice as an example of the 
minor cycle applied to each area of investigation. Two 
paintings were at the front of the class room during the 
first of the two classes devoted to aesthetics. One, painted 
by a professional artist depicted a sad child in somber ~reys 
and blues. The other was an amateur's conception of a 
ketch sailing off a spit of land. Its colors were post-
card hues. The paintings started arguments among the 
students even before the class began. Violent likes and 
dislikes soon established the class was divided into groups 
of pros and cons to discuss their reasons for preferring 
one picture or the other. When the instructor judged the 
romantic excitement to be on the wane she called for 
reports from the groups. An analysis was made of the 
reasons g iven for finding beauty in the works. This led to 
questions of wh at beauty is . Plato ' s and Plotinus ' ladders 
of beauty were introduced. A brief sketch of the history 
of aesthetics ended the session. The second meeting 
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brought up the question of metaphysics; one goes back to 
this area of thought over and over again be fore the problems 
of other disciplines can be resolved. Finally, the 
instructor introduced Dr. Suzanne Langer's discussions about 
art as symbol. The majority of the class anticipated 
Langer ' s conclusions, the t wo paintings had had their effect. 
If it is any judgment tha t the a im of this course was 
fulfilled requests for further study of phi losophy, never 
made at Otis Air Force Base before, have been sufficiently 
IS" I 
numerous to schedule further courses. The students in the 
course made a mass attack on the local bookstore buying 
every paper-backed philosophy work available . They ordered 
many more. That the rhythmic presentation of the material 
rather than the tra ining or personality of the instructor 
is the reason for the student ' s interest is not provable. 
It does seem to the instructor to be the reason. She will 
continue to teach according to her understanding of White-
head's doctrines. 
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CHAPI'ER VI 
CONCWSIONS 
1 . There is a noticeable movement current in the 
United Stetes to standardize educational pr actices . To 
cbvose as a criterion for stand a rdization S?ecific bodies 
of f~cts to 
vmuld be to 
be mastered by studen ts on a n~tiom·1ide basis 
<)tLLLf'-t 
satisly learning , to decrease opportunities 
for the experiencing of novelty . CulturDl progress would 
be endangered . To base pr3ctices and curricula ... mon a v plue 
scheme :1cceptC~ble to a majority of citizens 'l.vould allovl 
scope for slm,, or rapid change in knO"Wl edge an d in soci:1l 
patterns . ~rub3cher 1 s com? l aint th~t educ~tors too often 
have no uncerlying tl·,eory of V:-1lUeS :..14 0n d..,ich to bzse 
their oractices of~ers one r2c>son =or the ·.J~esent con-
. -
fusion . As DeHey ' s educetional theories rode the band-
\·.'- ~O'"' -:;.t a time '.,'hen they served to vitalize pr actices 
long stagnant .. hitehe:1d 1 s theories mig ht wel l tulfill a 
siinilar function . A phi loso. hy of education gr O'i·:ing , a s 
does Whitehead ' s, from a cosmolog ica l view compatib le with 
rnodern science and incorporating a value scheme non- sectarian 
yet religious ~n import might -v:e ll be qccep teble to many 
educ~tors if trey were familiBr ·~1ith the cost!lvlo,_,ica l frame -
\.,·ork of the theories . 
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2 . As Hughes says , the "great educ.;.tion31 significance"1 
of 1 i~1itehead ' s doctri!1e o: events of prehensive a ctivity 
tnay !1Cvcr imoress ? ro[essi...mal educators · ... mless the doctrine 
can be couched in more familiar terminology . ~hitehead 's 
Re:1l .orld of .\ctivity , of the ontologic;::~l .Jri1:1ci .. l e , is 
described in l.2110 ..1age most difficult to tr.:=mslate ·1:1ithout 
a lteri:-tg meanings . He chose novel terms on purpose to 
av oid outu:.oc'ied conce.,.:::ts e .. 1bedded in traditional philosophica l 
l an6uage . It is a futile hope that colleges of education 
rJil l require students to de l ve intc- ~ny .~1etal hysicc l system 
--:s deeply as one must into \:hitehe,..,d ' s to grPS;J the im •. ort 
of ~is ~octrine to education . This thesis purports to 
show the intim3te connection bet\·:een the ontology and the 
specific educqtional pr act ices r~co•:hi.iended . Yet it still 
is not poss i b le to be fnithful to '. hitehead ' s concerts 
,. it'hout incorpor3ting ·L.iony of his mvn terms in the des -
cript ion o~ his doctrines . This is a criticism of the 
applicability to educational practices of the doctrines 
but it is not a criticism of the cosmology -;;.;hich , after all 
de8ls .vith a univer se far too c omplex to describe pat l y 
over the back fence . 
1. Hughes , Percy , "Is ~·Jhitehead ' s Psychology ~dequate?" , 
The Philosophy of Alfred North r.Jhitehead , ed . P . A. 
Schilpp (Ne•v You: Tudor Publishing Co . , 1951), p . 279 . 
3 . Conant, an authoritative voice to many school 
boards and interested citizens , has put the mark of 
approval on the subject - centered curriculum. It is doubt-
ful at this time that other methods of systematizing the 
learning process wi l l be widely tried. Therefore, the 
protests \<Jhi tehead makes against dead knmvledge , inert 
ideas , and unused knml l edge are germane. An understanding 
of the rhythmic nature of learning applied to curriculum 
planning as well as to the teacher ' s daily lesson p l ans 
can obviate to a great extent the ~vaning rnotivation shovm 
by many students as they pass from the lower to the higher 
g r ades . 
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4 . \vho is the child who passes from the lower to the 
higher grade? \Jhitehead has not devoted particular 
attention to the element of continuity in the human career . 
No agent exists experiencing first nursery school then 
college . It is apparent that the physical body of the child 
is in no way carried into adulthood . Yet the child \vho 
calls himse lf Johnny feels himself still to be the adult , 
John . Christian thought discovers John ' s soJl to be the 
same soul throughout . Freud pos its the ego . :lhitehead 
accounts for certain aspects of continJity in his doctrine 
of inheritance . He does not provide an explanation for the 
feeling one has of still being the same person throughout 
one ' s lifetime. 
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5 . The problem of knaNledge is solved by the phi lo-
sophy of organism in showing existence to be prehensive 
activity. The cosmology might almost be called an episte-
mology . Experience is prehending . Do v7e live only in order 
to know ? This might be a \veakness of whitehead ' s psychology 
if \7e concentrat ed on his analysis of discreet events of 
experience . Instead, the value of knowing in the life 
career of a man is found to be that he can live better, 
increasing his pov1ers in the a ttack upon the environment . 
Whitehead does not provide for an i mmorta l existence for 
the individual, as a whole , to outlast his mortal span . 
The immortality o f the organic phi losophy is far more 
satisfying , far less dubious , making the effort of daily 
living, of learning \vorth.vhile . Each and every act attains 
immortality as datum for the future, as datum for God . If 
the knowledge we acquire does rna~e our subsequent behavior 
of greater v alue t o others we need not wait for heavenly 
rewards . wr failure to learn carries \vith it the sin of 
o.mi.s sion and if the outcome is affected adversely we 
suffer nmv. The tremendous sense of r esponsibility to 
learn is not an unbearable burden for the question \Jhy 
bother at all ? receives an answer . There is cos~ic 
importance to every act . Human beings crave the feeling 
of importance . \vhitehead ' s cosmology gr1nts it . The 
student who understands even vaguely his responsibility 
to the univer se , to the future , to God cannot retnain un -
tnotivated to learn for long . 
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6 . St udents who lack the ability to understand , slow 
learners , or emotionall y disturbed young peop l e are not dis-
cussed by whit ehead . Al though he deals in great detail with 
the curriculum for a general education at the secondary 
level ~e does not consider the duller minds , a percentage 
of the population forced to at t end high schools , an element 
th~t must be considered . The guidance he does propose on a 
day to day basis '~ill not be sufficient for disturbed 
students , nor could any teacher , even if ~roperly trained, 
devote sufficient time to be of significant help . White -
head insists the student be treated as a whole person yet 
he neglects an area of responsibility the schools quite 
rightly already assume . He seems to be adlressin~ himself 
to educqtors of schools where a selection of students is 
made rather than to n whol e nation perplexed by the problem 
f"7 
of educating certain segments of its population under the 
law of compulsory education. 
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7. The role of parent as teacher and the effect of 
the home upon the learning experiences in the school are 
not discussed by f,.hitehead . We can suppose that the parent 
.,vho understands the rhythm of the le:trning process would 
supplement the school experiences . The home where respect 
for knowledge is l acking must have a seriously adverse 
effect upon a student . These matters could be ar some con-
sideration . 
8 . Whitehead ' s remarks about education usually refer 
to the student as a male . we suppose he is considering 
both .boys and girls in these cases . He does not conceive 
that educating \vomen is a problem in itself . The a im of 
education is stated , to produce "men ~vho possess both 
culture and expert knowledge in some special direction. " 1 
To produce h7omen of culture involves no ?roblem but what 
expert ~na~ledge will a woman aim to possess? If the 
fem~le is included in ~hitehead ' s recommendations , girls 
'dill specialize in whatever area of learning their natural 
appitudes dictate . Society has not yet integrated the 
feminine expert unless her speciality is housekeeping, 
1 . Whitehead, Aims ... , p . 13. 
J.rt: 
teaching , or nursing . The woman ' s role in the general 
culture needs clarification before the education of girls 
c ."ln be delineated. The curriculum suggested by t:hitehead 
does little to improve woman ' s present ambivalent role . 
158 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adler, Mortimer J . 
The Idea of Freedom. 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1958. 
Alberty, Harold 
Reorganizing the High School Curriculum. 
- New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953 . 
Barzun, Jacques 
Teachers in America. 
New York: DOubleday & Company, Inc., 1954. 
Bixler, J . s. 
"Whdltehead ' s Philosophy of Religion. " 
Schilpp (ed. ), PANW, 487-512 . 
Blyth, John w. 
Whitehead • s Theory of Knowledge . 
Providence: Brown University, 1941. 
Bolton, Frederick E. , and John E. Corbally 
Educational Sociology. 
New York: Aiilerican Book Company, 1941. 
Broudy, Harry s. 
Building a Philosophy of Education. 
New York: Prentice-Rail , Inc., 1954. 
Brubacher, John s. 
Modern Philosophies of Education. 2nd ed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , (1939)1950 . 
Conant, James Bryant 
The American Highschool Today. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959. 
Recommendations for Education in the Junior High School. 
Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1960. 
159 
160 
Dewey, John 
Democracy and Education. Rev . ed. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, (1916)1930. 
Experience and Education. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. 
_______ .. __ _ 
"The Philosophy of Whitehead." 
Schilpp (ed.), P~l, 641-700. 
'Oucasse, C.J. 
"On the Function and Nature of the Philosophy of Education." 
Harvard Ed. Rev., XXVI(l956), 103-111. 
Emmet, Dorothy M. 
Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism. 
LOndon: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1932. 
Forman, Ian 
"Educational Breakthrough." 
Boston Daily Globe, Dec. 16, 1959. 
Frankena, William K. 
"Toward a Philosophy of the Philosophy of Education." 
Harvard Ed. Rev., XXVI(l956), 94-98. 
Griswold, A. Whitney 
Liberal Eduaation and the Democratic Ideal. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 
Goheen, John 
"Whitehead • s Theory of Value. 11 
Schilpp (ed.), PAN~, 435-460. 
Hartshorne, Charles 
"On Some Criticisms of Whitehead • s Philosophy." 
Philosophical Rev., XLIV(l935), 323-344. 
"\vhitehead • s Idea of God. 11 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 413-560. 
161 
Highet, Gilbert 
The Art of Teaching. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1958. 
Hocking, vlilltam Ernest 
1'\vhitehead on Mind and Nature." 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 381-404. 
Hoffman, Banesh 
The Strange Story of the Quantum. 
New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959. 
Holmes, Henry Wyman 
''Whitehead's Views on Education. " 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 619-640. 
Hooper, Sidney E. 
''Whitehead's Philosophy: Actual Entities." 
Philosophy, XVI(l941), 285-305. 
----·-----
"Whitehead's Philosophy: Eternal Objects and God." 
Philosophy, XVII(l942), 47-68. 
Hughes, Percy 
"Is Whitehead's Psychology Adequate?" 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 273-300. 
Hutchins, R.M. 
"A Reply to Professor Whitehead." 
The Atlantic Monthly, CLVIII(l936), 582-588. 
James, William 
The Philosophy of William James. 
New YorK: The Modern Library, (1925)1953. 
Johnson, A.H. 
"The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead." 
The Journal of Philosophy, XL(l943), 261-271. 
Johnson, A.H. 
"'Truth, Beauty and Goodness' in the Philosophy of 
A. N. \fuitehead . 11 
Philosophy of Science, XI(l944), 9-29. 
-----------
''Whitehead and the Making of Tomorrow." 
162 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, V(l945), 398- 406. 
----------t'Whitehead' s Discussion of Education." 
Education, LXVI(l946), 653-671. 
"Whitehead's Philosophy of History." 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vll(l946), 234-249 . 
----------Whitehead's Theory of Reality . 
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952. 
----------Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization. 
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1958. 
Krash,Otto 
Rev. of Hechinger , An Adventure in Education: Connecticut 
Points the Way (195 • 
Educational Theory, VII(l957), 283. 
Langer, Susanne K. 
Philosophy in a New Key. 
New York~ The New American Library, (1942)1958. 
Leclerc, Ivor 
Whitehead's Metaphysics . 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. 
Levi, A.W. 
"The Problem of Higher Education: t-lhitehead and Hutchins. u 
Harvard Ed. Rev., VII(l937), 451-465. 
Lindzey, Gardner (ed . ) 
Assessment of Human Motives. 
New York: Grove Press , Inc., 1960. 
Lintz, Edward J . 
The Unity of the Universe According to Alfred North 
Whitehead. 
Baltimore: J.H. Furst , 1939. 
Lowe, Victor 
"The Development of t.Jhitehead ' s Philosophy. " 
Schilpp {ed. ), PANW, 15-124. 
May , Rollo, Ernest Angel , and Henri F. Ellenberger (ed. ) 
Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology. 
New York: Basic BookS , Inc . , 1958. 
Mead, Margaret 
"The Coming Revolution in Education. " 
Harvard Business Rev., reprinted in Best Articles and 
Stories, Jan. , 196o. 
Meyer, Adolphe E. 
An Educa tional History of the American'"l People . 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. , 1957. 
Millard , Richard M. 
"The Place of Value in Whitehead's Philosophy. " 
163 
Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Boston University, 1950. 
Morris, B. 
"The Art-Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead . " 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 461-486. 
Mosier, Richard D. 
"Preface to an Educational Philosophy." 
Ed. Theory, 1(1951), 218-223. 
· Murphy, A.E. 
"Objective Relativiam in Dewey and Whitehead." 
Philosophical Rev. , XXXVI(l927), 121-144. 
Northrop, F.s.c. and Mason w. Gross (ed.) 
Alfred North Whitehead, An Anthology. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. 
Ratner, Joseph (ed.) 
164 
Intelligence in the Modern World. John Dewey's Philosophy. 
New York: The MOdern Library, 1939. 
Riesman, David 
Constraint and Variety in American Education. 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958. 
Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.) 
The Dictionary of Philosophy. 
New York: Philosophical Library, 1942. 
Russell, Bertrand 
Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell. 
New York: The MOdern Library, (1927)1955. 
Sargent, Cyril G. 
Educating the Children of Falmouth, Massachusetts. 
Center for Field Studies, Harvard Graduate School 
of Education, 1952. 
Schilpp, Paul A., (ed.) 
The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. 2nd. ed. 
New York: Tudor Publishing Company, (1941)1951. 
"Whitehead 's Moral Philosophy." 
Schilpp (ed.), PANW, 561-618. 
Shahan, Ewing P. 
Whitehead's Theory of Experience . 
New York: King 1s Crown Press, 1950. 
Smith, B. 06hanel, W.O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores 
Fundamentals of Curriculum Development. 
New York: World Book Company, 1957. 
Urban, Wilbur Marshall 
"Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and Its Relation to 
His Metaphysics . " 
Schilpp (ed. ), PANW , 301-328. 
Wells, H.K. 
"The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. " 
Science and Society, XVI(l951-1952) , 27-43 . 
White , Morton 
Social Thought in America, The Revolt Against Formalism. 
Boston: The Beacon Press , (1947)1957 . 
Whitehead, Alfred North 
"Fundamental Principles in Education." 
165 
Report of the 87th Xeetinl of the British Assn. for the 
Advancement of $c1ence , ( 919) , 361. 
The Concept of Nature . 
Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, (1920)1957 . 
"Science in General Education. " 
Proc . of Second Congress of Universities of the Empire , 
(LOndon: G. Bell & Sons, 1921) , 31-39. 
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. 
Cambridge: The University Press, 1925. 
Religion in the Making . 
Northrop and Gross (ed. ), ~~. 467-529 . 
----------Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect . 
Northop and Gross ( ed.), ANW, 533-561. 
--.. --------
Aims of Education. 
New York: The New American Library, (1929)1955 . 
Whitehead, Alfred North 
The Function of Reason. 
Boston: The Beacon Press, (1929)1958 • 
.. ---------Process and Reality. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929. 
----------Science and the Modern tlorld. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, (1929)1957 . 
Adventures of Ideas. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, (1933)1935 . 
----------Modes of Thought . 
The Macmillan Company, (1938)1957 . 
----------Essays in Science and Philosophy. 
New York: Philosophical Library, 1947. 
166 
ABSTRACI' 
Whitehead's theories of education scattered throughout 
his works have first been collected and coOrdinated in this 
thesis. Their foundation in his metaphysical position is 
then demonstrated. The persuasiveness of the educational 
commandments in chapter two is seen to lie in an under-
standing of Whitehead's cosmology outlined in chapter three. 
The student's needs, interests and patterns of growth must 
determine the educational program; the student is a living 
being. His experience of his environment is his existence. 
Experience is an advance from disjunction to conjunction. 
It is subjective activity individualizing a generic cre-
ativity. Actuality is a mode of activity, prehending, 
that synthesizes objective data. Inert ideas and dogmatic 
finaliti~s are a burden to the student for they do not 
reflect reality. 
One of Whitehead's major contributions to educators 
is his doctrine that learning is rhythmic in character, 
advancing from disjunction to conjunction as a cyclical 
process. The process germinates in freedom as a stage of 
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romance , develops through the discipline of precision, 
flowering in the wider freedom of generalization. Appli-
cation of this doctrine to curriculum planning and to 
teaching practices, this thesis concludes, can help to 
overcome the problem of waning motivation to learn prevalent 
among students as they advance towards higher education. 
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Curriculum reform recommended by Whitehead, although 
apparently conservative , is revolutionary. Subject-centered 
systematization is retained yet each subject is taught as an 
aspect of the one subject, Life . Literary, scientific and 
technical educations are the specific divisions in Whitehead ' s 
application of his general educational theories. Each 
discipline displays Life from its specific perspective 
approaching the general ideas through particular facts . 
Subject matter must be limited to ideas whose worth 
as well as whose truth can be proved. Facts are to be 
experienced first-hand. Reconstruction of experience is 
in the interest of attaining wisdom and style. The educated 
person will be able to act with decision and economy, 
uniting thought and action. This thesis shows the teacher's 
role requires artistry to maintain the delicate balance 
between too great a limitation of subject matter and too 
broad a presentation obviating learning in depth. 
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Another maaor purpose is to relate Whitehead 's pro-
posed educational practices to his theories of value. 
Whitehead's contention that the educated man is the civilized 
man and that a civilization is char~cterized by the values 
its people display draws the axiology into the philosophy of 
education. Chapter four locates the source of values in 
reality where all experience is found to be of value in 
some way. Although Whitehead 's God is integral to his meta-
physical scheme there is a non-sectarianism to his normative 
theories . Morality is a mode of controlling process to 
maximize importance . It is generality of outlook in which 
concern for the future in light of the general good controls 
behavior. ~There knowledge can affect the outcome, it becomes 
a religious duty to acquire knowledge . 
Truth, beauty, adventure, peace are positive values: 
They are good because in proper proportion to each other 
they are creative. The conclusion is drawn that Whitehead ' s 
value scheme offers a criterion for educators to standardize 
practices on a nationwide basis. No one body of facts can 
serve as a criterion. Exact knowledge is an ever illusive 
ideal man cannot attain; reality is process, facts are in 
the making as creativity is individualized be experience. 
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Finally, professional educators' neglect of Whitehead's 
philosophy of education is not justified in light of its 
applicability to a wide variety of circumstances as outlined 
in chapter five of this thesis. 
